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Abstract  
Traditionally, several different methods are fully capable of providing an adequate 
degree of security to the threats and attacks that exists for revealing different keys. 
Though almost all the traditional methods give a good level of immunity to any 
possible breach in security keys, the biggest issue that exist with these methods is the 
dependency over third-party applications. Therefore, use of third-party applications 
is not an acceptable method to be used by high-security applications. For high-
security applications, it is more secure that the key generation process is in the hands 
of the end users rather than a third-party. Giving access to third parties for high-
security applications can also make the applications more venerable to data theft, 
security breach or even a loss in their integrity. In this research, the evolutionary 
computing tool Eureqa is used for the generation of encryption keys obtained by 
modelling pseudo-random input data. Previous approaches using this tool have 
required a calculation time too long for practical use and addressing this drawback is 
the main focus of the research. The work proposes a number of new approaches to 
the generation of secret keys for the encryption and decryption of data files and they 
are compared in their ability to operate in a secure manner using a range of statistical 
tests and in their ability to reduce calculation time using realistic practical 
assessments. A number of common tests of performance are the throughput, chi-
square, histogram, time for encryption and decryption, key sensitivity and entropy 
analysis. From the results of the statistical tests, it can be concluded that the proposed 
data encryption and decryption algorithms are both reliable and secure. Being both 
reliable and secure eliminates the need for the dependency over third-party 
applications for the security keys. It also takes less time for the users to generate 
highly secure keys compared to the previously known techniques.The keys generated 
via Eureqa also have great potential to be adapted to data communication 
applications which require high security.  
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
Every day, large quantities of digital data are exchanged over public networks. 
Much of these data are confidential and require protection to avoid being leaked 
to an eavesdropper. Despite data protection being so crucial to end users, the 
security keys used to guard against malicious access are nearly always generated 
by third-party applications and agencies. Data security requires that keys are 
known only to the sender and the intended recipient, but, by adopting keys 
generated by third party applications, it remains possible that the third party may 
have introduced some means of breaching the security of the data transmission. 
To reduce the reliance on such third party applications, and hence, the security 
vulnerability that it introduces, an alternative approach is adopted in this thesis 
where the end users themselves generate the keys using a transparent method. 
Cryptography has a long history, at least thousands of years. One early known 
use was around 100 BCE, when the Roman emperor Julius Caesar introduced a 
technique of shifting individual characters in a message for the purpose of 
government communication [1]. This technique became popularly known as the 
‘Shift Cipher’ which is the most well-known substitution cipher [1]. In the 16th 
century, the French mathematician Blaise de Vigenere was the first to propose the 
use of encryption keys. When used in conjunction with shift ciphers, keys define 
specific shifts that are applied to the individual characters in the message [2]. 
Security breaches that occurred during the First World War were catalysts of the 
invention of new encryption methods. At the end of the war, Hebern, working in 
the USA, designed an electro-mechanical encryption system known as the Hebern 
Rotor Machine [3]. A similar machine known as the Enigma was developed and 
further enhanced by a German engineer, Arthur Scherbius [4]. The Enigma was 
used by the German and other governments to encrypt information and was later 
used by the Nazis to encrypt much if their military communications. In 1932, texts 
encrypted by Enigma were broken by Polish scientists who had previously studied 
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methods of encryption at schools in Berlin. In the 1950s, Claude Shannon 
developed both mathematical cryptography and information theory, and his work 
is often considered to be foundational to modern encryption methods and in the 
development of the basic principles often followed in the process of designing 
encryption algorithms [5]. 
According to Kerckhoffs's principle, ‘A cryptosystem should be secure even if 
everything about the system, except the key, is public knowledge’ [5]. However, 
this principle does not necessarily remain valid if the security keys are generated 
by a third-party application or agency, such as a government institution or a 
commercial company, who may generate the keys without any guarantee that the 
keys themselves will be passed to another party either directly or stored for later 
access. This risk can be mitigated if the end users are given full control over the 
generation of the security keys, increasing their confidence that confidential data 
remains secure. 
In this research, a new technique is proposed for the generation of security 
keys. The proposed approach allows for the generation of security keys using a 
process that is controlled primarily by cryptographers themselves. An innovative 
computer tool, Eureqa [6],[7], is used to randomly generate a mathematical 
equation which forms the encryption key. Further, the generated mathematical 
equations approximate a random number sequence that is used to provide values 
that can be applied to the data to be encrypted and so obtain the cipher. The 
security keys generated with the aid of Eureqa are validated using a set of 
statistical tests. This approach to key generation using Eureqa was first introduced 
by Blackledge et al. [8]. Blackledge and his fellow researchers established that the 
method can produce keys to a level of security similar to that of existing popular 
methods. 
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This study is similar to those of Blackledge et al. [8], in that it is based on the 
use of the Evolutionary Computing approach in Eureqa and also generates keys 
by modelling pseudo-random input data obtained from a suitable source. In this 
research, novel solutions are proposed that provide automated keys generated 
using Eureqa with a much reduced execution time, making the encryption process 
better suited to practical application. In addition, a range of statistical tests is 
applied to demonstrate the security of the novel encryption processes. 
1.1. Research Motivation  
Evolutionary computing in cryptography is generally carried out by generating 
an initial seed to initiate the calculation of a mathematical equation, which can 
then be used as a secret key in traditional encryption and decryption processes. 
The work presented by Blackledge et al. [8] models 250 samples of a pseudo-
random number sequence using Eureqa, and was reported to take around 23 hours 
to generate a single mathematical key for the encryption and decryption purposes, 
but no assessment of the  security of the approach was made. This encryption 
work was adopted by Dlamini [9] in the implementation of a risk-based multi-
factor authentication system to monitor user behaviour in an assessment of access 
protection for cloud-based services. Eureqa was used to generate an encryption 
function, but its calculation took an exhaustive CPU time on a standard desktop 
system.  
In [10], Blackledge trained a neural network to approximate input noise with 
the aim of generating a nonlinear function. Atmospheric noise generated from 
radio emissions affected by lightening, electronic noise and radioactive decay was 
provided to Eureqa, which then generated an encryption function to model the 
data. The output of Eureqa was approximated with the input noise to generate a 
non-linear function which is the encryption algorithm. The security of such an 
approach was assessed by a range of metrics, including the Lyapunov exponent, 
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cycle length, key diffusion and entropy. Algorithmic processing time was not 
provided in the publication. 
The extended processing time required for the generation of keys in [8] and [9] 
is not acceptable in practical environments. For real-time streaming applications, a 
practical approach is needed to ensure that keys are not only generated and 
applied in a reasonable time, but also that the security of the approach is 
demonstrated using appropriate statistical tests.  
1.2. Aim and objectives  
The aim of the research is to develop a practical and secure encryption method 
whose operation is both known and controlled by users rather than by third 
parties.   
The research has the following objectives. 
• To carry out a literature review to understand the current state of encryption 
and related technologies, so as to identify an appropriate area in which the 
research should be pursued. 
• To propose an encryption method that is not only controlled by users, but also 
gives acceptable performance in terms of calculation time and security. 
• To perform a series of experiments to investigate the strengths and limitations 
of the new method in relation to existing approaches. A number of alternative 
incarnations of the new method is investigated, including versions that are 
accelerated, potentially less secure and use different underlying mechanisms 
to generate the encryption equation. 
• To demonstrate the operation of the new method on both text and image files. 
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1.3. Thesis outline  
This thesis is organized as follows. 
Chapter 1 provides background and motivation of the work carried out in thesis, 
as well as the aim and objectives.  
Chapter 2 gives a brief historical overview of cryptography and introduces 
common approaches taken for both symmetric and asymmetric cryptography.  
Also presented is a literature review of the more prominent modern techniques 
being used in cryptography. Related work is described in the generation of the 
bespoke security keys, leading to a definition of the topic of the current research. 
Chapter 3 provides a detailed explanation of the procedures and tools used in 
carrying out the experimental work in this study. The chapter also defines the 
scope and features of the encryption system. The proposed system architecture is 
also introduced in this chapter. 
Chapter 4 presents a performance evaluation of the sequence of numbers 
generated using Eureqa, in order to confirm their statistical characteristics. This 
chapter also investigates the impact of adopting 32-bit or 64-bit computer 
architectures on the ability of the approach to successfully perform encryption and 
decryption. 
Chapter 5 provides the results for a range of tests using keys generated by Eureqa 
in their application to the encryption and decryption of text files.  
Chapter 6 In this chapter, results are provided from a respective range of tests by 
employing respective keys generated by Eureqa, based on the application of 
image files.  
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Chapter 7 draws conclusions from the results of Chapters 4, 5 and 6 and 
recommends areas for future work.  
1.4. Original Contributions 
As long execution times have adversely affected the practical application of 
previous evolutionary computing approaches, the focus of this work is to provide 
a faster method for key generation while minimizing impact on key security. 
The specific contributions are as follows. 
• Development of a number of candidate approaches that are able to reduce 
execution time by using an ensemble of shorter sequences.   
• Design and implementation of a rigorous methodology that is able to 
compare the performance of the candidate approaches using a series of 
mathematical tests. 
• The practical investigation of the candidate approaches using a broad range 
of realistic use cases.  
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Chapter 2. Background of Cryptography and literature 
review 
This chapter provides a brief introduction of information security and its 
principles. A brief history of cryptography is first discussed.  Next, components of 
information security systems are reviewed.  Types of cryptography are introduced 
followed by in related work that investigates the generation of bespoke keys using 
Eureqa. Finally, a summary of the chapter is provided. 
2.1. Brief History of Cryptography  
Up to the 1970s, classical cryptographic algorithms were based on permutation 
and substitution techniques. Substitution is a method of encoding by which 
“units” of plaintext are replaced with ciphertext according to a fixed 
system/pattern [11]. To perform such encoding, the “units” may be single letters 
(e.g., Shift ciphers or the Caesar cipher), pairs of letters (e.g., Vigenere cipher), or 
triplets of letters. Similarly, permutation is a method of encryption by which the 
positions held by units of plaintext are shifted according to a regular system so 
that the ciphertext develops as a permutation of the plaintext [11]. Algorithmic 
networks based on the techniques (substitution and permutation) using only a 
single secret key to encrypt or decrypt information/messages are commonly 
known as symmetric algorithms (symmetric cryptography). Symmetric stream 
ciphers and block ciphers are the two variants in symmetric cryptography. In 
stream ciphers, encryption is performed letter by letter (or byte by byte). In block 
ciphers each block of data is encrypted separately. 
In 1976, the idea of public key cryptography was introduced by two scientists, 
Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman. They published “New Directions in 
Cryptography” [12] by introducing two different keys instead of a single secret 
key as in symmetric cryptography. In public key cryptography, one of the keys is 
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used for the encryption process and the other is used for the decryption process 
[11]. Either key can be used for encryption or decryption as long as the other key 
is used to reverse the process. In 1978, Ronald L. Rivest, Adi Shamir and Leonard 
M. Adleman were inspired by the Diffie-Hellman work and they proposed a new 
algorithm (RSA) based on the difficulty of factoring large prime numbers [13]. It 
was the first practical public key cryptosystem. For the last few decades, RSA has 
been the most popular and accepted practical solution for security applications 
requiring public key cryptography. The main principle to the operation of RSA is 
that in the equation 
(𝑚𝑒)𝑑 = 𝑚 (mod 𝑛)  , 
where e, d and n are large integers and 0 ≤ 𝑚 ≤ 𝑛, it is computationally difficult 
to determine d even when e, n and m are known. In RSA, m is the message, a 
public key is formed from e and n and a private key from d. However, two 
problems with RSA are its high computational power requirements and longer key 
lengths required for more secure applications [11]. In order to overcome these 
problems, Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) was introduced by scientists: Neil 
Koblitz [14] and Victor Miller [15] in 1986. It gained popularity due to its 
provision of shorter key lengths as compared to its counterpart (RSA). The main 
problem in ECC is its use of non-unified group laws to compute another point on 
the specified curve, i.e. point addition and point doubling [16].  This makes 
elliptic curve implementation susceptible to side-channel attacks.  Edwards 
Curves is a newer technology that uses unified group laws and is less susceptible 
to side-channel attacks against its implementation.   
 
Shor’s algorithm [17] demonstrated that using a quantum computer, it would be 
possible to perform integer factorization in polynomial time, thus potentially 
making practical the brute-force deciphering of messages encrypted using RSA to 
be achieved in practice.  
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2.2. Information Security Systems 
Information security is defined by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics 
Engineering (IEEE) as “the degree to which a collection of data is protected from 
exposure to accidental or malicious alteration or destruction” [18]. In 2005, the 
International Standard Organization (ISO) also defined information security by 
ISO/IEC 27002 standard as “the preservation of confidentiality, integrity and 
availability” [19]. Generally, confidentiality, integrity and availability are the 
goals/principles of any information security system [20]. These principles are 
known as the CIA triad. 
• Confidentiality: Ensures that information is accessible only to those 
authorized who have access [20]-[21]. In other words, confidentiality is a set 
of rules and instructions that prevent unauthorized user access to 
data/information.  
• Integrity: Defines the accuracy and completeness of data/information [20]-
[21]. Moreover, it also maintains the consistency, accuracy and fidelity of 
data. In other words, data must not be changed and further steps must be 
taken to ensure data cannot be altered by users during data transmission [21]. 
Integrity of data at-rest must also be considered.  Integrity must also prevent 
accidental altering or deleting of data/information [20].  
• Availability: Ensures that authorized users have access to stored information 
and associated assets when required [20]-[21]. Factors affecting availability 
include intermittent or permanent system downtime due to hardware or 
software failures.  
2.2.1. Types of Information Security System Confidentiality 
For different applications (such as multimedia, audio or video conferencing, 
text, or images) information security system confidentiality can be classified into 
two different categories as shown in Figure 2.1. 
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• Information hiding 
• Information encryption   
 
 
Figure 2.1: Categories of Information Security Systems [22] 
A technique to hide information using cover data (such as audio, video and/or 
images) is commonly known as information hiding [22]. Similarly, information 
encryption is an art of encoding and decoding information using mathematical 
rules.  The main difference between the two confidentiality systems is that with 
encryption, it is obvious that information is there – but it is not hidden.  However, 
the goal with information hiding is to concealed the data using the cover data, 
known as steganography. For additional security, the data that is hidden could be 
protected by being encrypted.  
As discussed in chapter 1, a commonly used example of encryption is the 
Caesar cipher.  This cipher uses simple rules to replace one letter with another.  
The rules define which letters are replaced with other letters and it is obvious that 
some information is there, but it is encrypted [23].  Likewise, one of the first 
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purported uses of information hiding is as follows:  A message would be written 
on a messenger’s shaved head and the hair was allowed to grow back [24].  The 
messenger would then deliver the message and present his head for shaving and 
the hidden message would be revealed.   
In order to achieve security, categories defined in the previous paragraph are 
used with different techniques/approaches such as watermarking, steganography 
and cryptography. Watermarking and steganography techniques fall under the 
information hiding category whereas information encryption includes 
cryptography as shown in Figure 2.1. Digital watermarking is a technique in 
which metadata or other information is embedded into digital media [25]. This 
embedded metadata can then be detected and extracted – often to prove ownership 
or intellectual property rights. Watermarking is a technique which is used to hide 
digital information (the metadata) in a carrier signal (the digital media) [25]. 
2.3. Cryptography 
Cryptography is a mathematically based technology that has been studied 
and applied since ancient Roman times. It inspires new research directions even to 
this day. Cryptography is the art of encoding and decoding information so that it 
can be securely transmitted from sender to a receiver over an unsecured public 
channel without worry of eavesdropping or information modification [11]. The 
public channel could be wired, wireless, or even using the written word.  The 
basic flow of cryptography is illustrated in Figure 2.2. Broadly speaking, it is 
comprised of the following three steps: 
• Step 1 is the encryption process, which is used by sender to convert plaintext 
to ciphertext using a key, commonly known as the encryption key. Here, the 
term “plaintext” refers to the original information (before encryption). The 
ciphertext is the encrypted information (after encryption). 
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• Step 2 defines the transmission modes of information over an unsecured 
public channel, which could be either wired or wireless as shown in Figure 
2.2. 
• Step 3 is the reverse of encryption (Step 1), which is used by the receiver to 
convert ciphertext to plaintext using a key, commonly known as decryption 
key. 
 
Figure 2.2: Basic Flow diagram of Cryptography 
The study of classical cryptography deals with the algorithms and protocols 
which ensure confidentiality and integrity of information [26]. A cryptographic 
algorithm or protocol is considered secure if no one (eavesdropper / outside 
attacker) can extract information about the plaintext from cipher text. Specifics of 
this  definition are available in [26] and [27].  
Cryptography can be broadly categorized into two types: symmetric and 
asymmetric. 
2.3.1. Symmetric Key Cryptography 
Symmetric key cryptography requires only a single key (which is commonly 
known as the secret key) for encryption and decryption as shown in Figure 2.3. In 
other words, the secret key is also known as a shared secret between the sender 
and receiver  [28]. This shared secret must be kept secret from third parties such 
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as eavesdroppers and attackers. In order to protect information using symmetric 
cryptography, two different techniques can be used: stream ciphers and block 
ciphers. In stream ciphers both encryption and decryption are performed byte-by-
byte. In other words, each data byte is encrypted and decrypted individually. For 
block ciphers, the original information is divided into multiple blocks and each 
data block is encrypted and decrypted iteratively [29].   
There are advantages and disadvantages to both techniques.  Stream ciphers are 
simpler to implement, and data lost in a stream can be retransmitted or dropped 
without affecting the valid received data.  This is less secure, however.  Block 
ciphers often utilize the previous block as an initialization vector for the next 
block, making the information transmission more secure.  The disadvantage to 
this is that missing one block will make any subsequent block(s) non-decryptable 
until the missing block is received. 
 
Figure 2.3: Symmetric Key Cryptography 
2.3.2. Asymmetric Key Cryptography 
A type of asymmetric cryptography is public key cryptography.  Here, two 
different keys are required for encryption and decryption as shown in Figure 2.4. 
One key is termed the public key and the other is termed the private key [30]. For 
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one use of public key cryptography, the public key is used for encryption while 
the private key is used for the decryption process as shown in Figure 2.4.  
In the example shown in Figure 2.4, only the receiver’s keys are used.  The 
receiver makes his public key known to anyone wishing to send private messages 
to him.  The sender uses the public key to encrypt the message.  The receiver can 
then use the private key to decrypt the message. 
 
  Figure 2.4 : Asymmetric Key Cryptography 
If the sender and receiver wish to authenticate each other, both sets of keys 
may be used.  In this case the sender would encrypt with a private key followed 
by encrypting with the receiver’s public key [30].  The message ends up being 
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encrypted twice but the receiver can authenticate the sender using the sender’s 
public key in addition to the example in Figure 2.4. 
The current study does not encompass encryption involving separate public 
and private keys, but instead usually requires that a secure exchange of keys takes 
place before information is sent. Such an exchange of keys is an additional 
potential security concern, but it has been shown possible to implement 
encryption normally requiring a shared key without any explicit key exchange. In 
particular, this can be achieved using a ‘three-pass’ protocol [31]. In this protocol, 
a commutative algorithm is implemented, one in which data can be encrypted 
sequentially by two users and decryption can be carried out in either order. In the 
first pass, data encrypted by the originator is sent to the receiver. In the second 
pass, the receiver uses their own private key to double encrypt the data before 
sending it back to the originator. In the final pass, the originator decrypts the 
received data using their own original key before sending the message for a final 
time. The receiver now does not need a key from the sender, but can decrypt these 
data using their own key. One particular feature of the ‘three-pass’ approach, is 
that if the ciphertext is intercepted while being transmitted, a third-order 
polynomial equation that has no solution can be generated, providing effective 
defence against certain types of attack, particularly correlation attacks. The 
mathematical nature required for suitable keys that meet the commutative 
requirements are derived in the paper [31].  Not only should any key used for the 
‘three-pass’ protocol meet the requirements to be commutative, but the keys need 
to be of a certain minimum length to make an exhaustive attack impracticable. 
The main computational difficulties in intercepting these signals are lack of 
knowledge of the spectral embedding coefficient used by the sender, the practical 
inability to solve the one-dimensional phase retrieval problem and the difficultly 
in uniquely solving an under-determined cubic polynomial [31]. 
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Since encryption using public key cryptography is compute-intensive, often the 
authenticate step is done by signing a hash of the message rather than encrypting 
the whole message.  This is called a digital signature. 
In short, both sender and receiver generate their own respective private keys 
and derive their own public keys to share on a public channel.  Having each 
participant in the system own a set of public/private keys allows for authenticated 
and encrypted messaging.  A large area of research is in the efficient distribution 
of public keys – this is called public key infrastructure (PKI). 
Because symmetric key cryptography is more compute-efficient than public 
key cryptography, often a “key exchange” of symmetric keys takes place using 
public key cryptography.  A session is established between two parties using 
public key cryptography to both authenticate each end and to encrypt the initial 
channel.  Once established, a symmetric key can then be shared (and changed 
often if need be).  This system uses the advantage of public key cryptography to 
initiate a session then switches to symmetric key cryptography to bear the burden 
of larger data exchanges that may follow. 
2.3.3. Randomness in Cryptography 
A key feature of any modern cryptosystem involves randomness.  Generating 
keys for both symmetric and asymmetric cryptography rely on random numbers 
or random number sequences to protect the strength of any crypto algorithm.  
When key strength is low, the ciphertext can be vulnerable to attack resulting in 
leakage of plaintext, user identity, and possibly even injection of bad plaintext.  
This breaks the confidentiality and integrity portions of the CIA triad. 
No mathematical method used to produce a series of numbers can be 
considered truly random because of the determinism of the method.  Likewise, it 
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is impossible to prove a given series of numbers are truly random using a 
mathematical or statistical method.  Only a level of confidence can be given using 
statistical methods.  As Gail Gasram said, “Nothing is random, only uncertain” 
[32]. 
2.3.4. Classification of Randomness 
It is possible to categorize random number sequences into two categories:  
True Random Number Sequences (TRNs) and pseudo random number sequences 
(PRNs).  Computers produce deterministic results.  Since computers use finite 
state arithmetic and have round-off errors, computers are unable to produce true 
randomness.  Sequences produced eventually repeat and therefore finite. 
To obtain a TRNs, one must utilize specialized hardware solutions that are a 
non-deterministic component of a computer system – or at least data derived from 
a specialized hardware component [32].  
A PRNs device from a PRNG has its place in things like stream ciphers.  The 
speed is traded for true randomness.  A TRNs has applications as well, where the 
utmost security is required – but they take time to generate output.  Therefore, 
both have their place in cryptography. 
2.4. Related Work 
Cryptographic functions require keys to be generated from some sort of 
random number or random number sequence.  These “pseudo-random” numbers 
are typically obtained by mathematical computation and require some seed value 
to initialize the random number generator (Pseudo Random Number Generator – 
PRNG).  Generating the PRNG seed value is an important step to the security of 
the subsequently generated key.  To give a comprehensive background for this 
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study compared to previous work, this study focuses on several points as 
discussed in the following sections. 
2.4.1. Third Party Used to Encrypt Data 
As to who generates the random number, seed, and subsequent key must be 
taken into consideration.  If a third party generates the key or key pairs, the 
security of the third party must be vetted.  Additionally, if a user generates the key 
or key pair, the software used to generate the key and method of choosing a 
random number for the seed must be vetted as well.  Therefore, we can consider 
three types of key generation:  3rd party generated, 3rd party software, self-
generated, and self-generated with custom algorithm. 
The easiest key generation method for the user would be 3rd party generated.  
However, this may also be the least secure, especially if you don’t trust the third 
party.  It becomes even less secure if the key itself is stored at the 3rd party 
location such as a cloud provider [33].  Therefore, we focus on the other two types 
of key generation.  If the 3rd party software is used the generate the key, it would 
be best if the software was open source such that the algorithm and code can be 
vetted by many developers and users.  In this case, generating entropy for the seed 
to the 3rd party algorithm becomes the focus.  If a custom algorithm is chosen, this 
is not without risk either. “Security by obscurity” is a common phrase used to 
warn against un-vetted security mechanisms – it violates Kerckhoff’s principle 
[34]. Using a combination of known algorithms and generating random numbers 
with special sources of entropy is the focus of current research. 
2.4.2. Encryption Algorithms using PRNGs  
Encryption algorithms do use pseudo-random numbers.  The keys used in the 
encryption, however, are generated using pseudo-random numbers.  It is therefore 
advisable to investigate this hinge-pin of PRNGs.  PRNGs require some sort of 
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seed value to initialize them.  This seed should have a good source of entropy, 
since every number generated from the PRNG is deterministic based on the seed. 
One of the most well-known PNRGs is the linear congruential generator.  This 
algorithm uses a recurrence relation with a choice of parameters: modulus, 
multiplier, increment and seed.  There are many examples of poor choices for 
these parameters.  Even if a good set of parameters is chosen, there is still the 
choice of seed the value that must be determined.   
Sources of entropy can be divided into several types as well:  Computer 
activity based, user input based, physical phenomena based, and simulated 
physical phenomena based.  Computer activity such as current system time, I/O 
queues, interrupt timing, and various other statistical measures can be used to seed 
a PRNG.  Recent adoption of blockchain technology has even added a source of 
entropy:  the block hashes of blocks on the blockchain [35]. User input can be 
based on having the user type something on the keyboard and using the input 
typed, a hash of the input, and the keystroke timing generate entropy.  Different 
sources of physical phenomena include radioactive decay, radio background white 
noise, voice input [36], and other biometric data (fuzzy extractors) [37].   
2.4.3. Chaotic Encryption 
Chaos theory focuses on dynamical systems which are very sensitive to initial 
conditions.  Chaotic encryption uses chaotic maps which produce confusion and 
diffusion.  Since chaotic maps are intended to be very unpredictable, the entropy 
produced can be used in random number generation [38]. 
Random.org utilizes Atmospheric noise which is known to be a chaotic system.  
The use of numbers generated from sources such as random.org can be used to 
train a model of a PRNG or as a seed to an existing PRNG. 
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2.4.4. Evolutionary Computing 
One approach is to use evolutionary computing to derive a PRNG.  The work 
presented by Blackledge et al. [8] models 250 samples of a pseudo-random 
number sequence using Eureqa.  It was reported to take around 23 hours to 
generate a single mathematical key for encryption and decryption purposes. No 
assessment of the security of the approach was made, however, the generated 
cipher was shown to have attributes as good as or better than standard PRNGs.  
Attributes included Positive Lyapunov Exponent, Acceptable cycle length, and 
uniform distribution of PSDF and other statistics. 
This encryption work was adopted by Dlamini [9] in the implementation of a 
risk-based multi-factor authentication system to monitor user behavior in order to 
protect access to cloud-based services. Eureqa is used to generate an encryption 
function, but its calculation took an exhaustive CPU time on a standard desktop 
system. This result may be acceptable in a cloud-based service where compute 
resources are plentiful. A one-time pad is used with XOR operations to encrypt 
certain data in the cloud.  Noise is added to the stream cipher used so reversing 
the XOR is more difficult without knowing the custom algorithm used. 
In [10], input noise is used to generate a nonlinear function. Typical use of 
Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs) is to take high entropy data and derive a low 
entropy function.  The reverse is used in this case – training is meant to derive a 
nonlinear function which generates high entropy.  Sources of randomness include 
radio reception with atmospheric noise that is affected by lightning and electronic 
noise from radioactive decay. Data was provided to Eureqa which then generated 
an encryption function to model the data. The output of Eureqa was approximated 
with the input noise to generate a non-linear function from which the encryption 
algorithm is derived. The security of such an approach was assessed by a range of 
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metrics, including the Lyapunov exponent, cycle length, key diffusion and 
entropy. Algorithmic processing time was not recorded in the paper. 
The extended processing time required for the generation of keys in [8] and [9] 
is not acceptable in practical environments outside the cloud. For real-time 
streaming applications, a practical approach is needed to ensure that keys are 
generated and applied in a reasonable time. Additionally, the security of the 
practical approach must be demonstrated using appropriate statistical tests.   
In [39], a key exchange is proposed using identical neural networks and 
training.  Input vectors are common between the two neural networks and the 
same key can be derived on both ends of a public channel.  Future research 
extending the solution proposed in this paper could include a way to exchange 
keys between parties. 
2.5. Summary 
In this chapter a brief history of cryptography was discussed.   Confidentiality 
was highlighted showing uses of information hiding and information encryption.  
Also cryptography was introduced covering both symmetric and asymmetric 
systems.  Randomness was then discussed in its relationship to cryptography. 
Related work has been discussed in this chapter in regard to four main points:  
Third party encryption, utilizing PRNGs for encryption algorithms, chaotic 
encryption, and finally evolutionary computing, where it is considered best 
practice to generate keys without using a third party.  To aid key generation, there 
are sources of good random numbers using physical phenomena such as those 
from random.org.  The atmospheric data is used as a form of chaotic encryption to 
generate high entropy.  Though there is no proof that the numbers generated are 
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truly random – the statistical tests show they are one of the best random number 
sources currently available. 
These values can be used to train an evolutionary computing model to generate 
pseudo-random numbers in a statistically better fashion than traditional PRNGs 
(e.g., linear congruential generators).  Additionally, the model can seed a 
traditional PRNG.  
There are issues with using evolutionary computing.  Though Eureqa, an 
evolutionary computing software suite, produces a pseudo random number 
sequence and can be used for many cryptographic applications, due to the time 
required to derive the encryption it isn’t suitable for local encoding and more real-
time stream ciphers.  The focus of this work is to utilize a faster method of 
evolutionary computing to generate keys more suitable for real-time applications.  
A solution is proposed that provides automated keys generated using Eureqa with 
a much reduced execution time.  
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Chapter 3. Research methodology  
This chapter provides a detailed explanation of the procedures used in carrying 
out this study. The chapter explains the scope of the encryption system (Section 
3.1), the approach taken in the implementation of the encryption system (Section 
3.2), the requirements of the system (Section 3.3) and the development tools used 
as discussed in Section 3.4. The proposed system architecture is presented in 
Section 3.5.  
3.1. Scope of the proposed encryption system 
In all encryption systems, a method of generating an encryption key that is able 
to produce a secure cipher is required. A range of key-generation techniques have 
been described in the literature, including encryption algorithms using pseudo 
random numbers and evolutionary computing; these methods are discussed in 
detail in chapter 2.  
In this work, an evolutionary computing approach has been used to generate 
secret keys, using the software tool Eureqa [40] whose operation is further 
discussed later on in this chapter (Section 3.4.2). Eureqa is able to generate in an 
iterative manner a function that describes a supplied random number sequence. 
The main advantage of the proposed encryption system is that users can generate 
their own keys for encryption and decryption while attaining a high level of 
security, higher key space and better key sensitivity. 
3.2. Implementation of the proposed encryption system 
A high-level view of the proposed encryption system is provided in this 
section. The main features of the system are random number generation, 
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verification of the generated values using statistical tests and the use of Eureqa to 
generate an equation that becomes the secret key. An appropriate method is 
required to generate and test random numbers to ensure that they have the 
necessary characteristics of independence and unpredictability. In this work, the 
linear congruential generator (LCG) and atmospheric noise methods are used to 
generate random numbers. Detailed descriptions of these methods are provided in 
(Section 3.4.1). In order to test the random nature of these values, a range of 
statistical tests have been applied. Mathematical equations, which become the 
secret keys, are produced using Eureqa. The current work builds on the approach 
of Blackledge et al [8] in allowing the user to generate their own secret keys using 
Eureqa models of a PRN sequences [8]. The research flow implemented to 
produce encryption keys using Eureqa is illustrated in Figure 3.1. 
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Figure 3.1: Method used to generate encryption keys 
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3.3. System requirements  
The functional and non-functional requirements of the encryption system 
developed in this work are listed below.  
3.3.1. Functional requirements 
• For both the encryption and decryption processes, the system shall allow an 
effective and reliable method to generate secret keys. 
• For both the encryption and decryption processes, the system shall be able to 
deal with both text files and gray-scale image files. 
• In order to make effective use of the system, users shall have a reasonable 
knowledge of computer file types and the operation of computer systems 
3.3.2. Non-functional requirements 
In terms of software, the CentOS operating system will be used. All modeling 
is performed using the C++ high level language and the results analyzed in the 
Matlab environment. For image files, gray-scale images of 8-bit depth are used to 
determine the statistical properties of relevance to encryption using the proposed 
approaches.  
In terms of hardware, a quad-core Intel i5 CPU, 3.5 GB RAM, with 64-bit 
architecture running under CentOS [release 6.8 (final)] [41] is used to generate the 
mathematical equations (secret keys) and to perform encryption and decryption. 
3.4. Development Tools 
This section describes the design and development tools used in this study. 
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3.4.1. Pseudo random number (PRN) Generators 
PRNs can be generated using specific algorithms in which an initial seed is 
needed to initiate the process and subsequent values are obtained by performing 
an operation on previous values [42]. 
The algorithms used to generate random number sequences are deterministic, 
and so tend to generate sequences that repeat after a certain number of values. In 
practice, PRNs can be generated in such a way that their statistical properties are 
the same as would be found in a genuine random sequence. Hellekalek [43] stated 
that, “Random number generators are nothing more than deterministic algorithms 
that produce numbers with certain distribution properties.” In practical encryption 
applications, the property of repetition is undesirable because it makes it easier to 
predict the sequence of numbers and make it statistically easier for an attacker to 
determine the key value and so access encrypted information. The larger the 
number of values before the sequence repeats, the closer the PRN sequence comes 
to a True Random Number (TRN) sequence. If there is a large number of values 
before the PRN sequence repeats, then in many encryption applications there may 
be no practical advantage of using a TRN source [44]. Whether the quality of the 
values generated by a PRN source is appropriate depends on the application for 
which they are being produced [43].  
TRNGs (True Random Number Generators), built by using hardware, to 
generate a sequence of numbers have a nondeterministic characteristic.  The 
disadvantage of using this technique are the high price of the equipment used in 
the generator, the slow speed in the process of generating the numbers and the 
necessity to check the randomness because it changes according to the 
environment [45]. 
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3.4.2. Alea II  
Alea II is a compact random number generator designed to aid the 
development of cryptographic systems (including key generation, one time pads, 
cryptographic nonces and DSA signature generation). In Alea II, wide-band 
Gaussian white noise obtained from a reverse-biased semiconductor junction is 
passed through an analog-to-digital converter to an embedded microprocessor. 
The microprocessor combines the entropy obtained from several samples, 
outputting a random bit stream that minimizes bias and correlation [46].   
It is not possible to generate truly random numbers from deterministic 
machines such as a computer so any PRNG is a technique developed to generate 
random numbers using a computer. 
In this research, the following approaches have been used to generate random 
numbers. 
3.4.3. Linear congruential generator (LCG) 
Blackledge et al. established rules to be followed to obtain suitable PRNs for 
encryption purposes [47]. PRNs require a seed to initiate the generation of the 
first number and subsequent values are generated iteratively [42].  The LCG [48] 
is one of the simplest and oldest PRN generation algorithm and is commonly used 
in encryption [49], [50]. LCG is characterized by simplicity in terms of 
implementations and it requires short calculation times [51], [52]. It generally 
produces relatively few values in each sequence before repetition and this is 
generally regarded as its principal weakness [48]. This method produces a stream 
of integer random numbers in the range [0, m-1], where in practical 
implementations ‘m’ is normally the word length of the computer system or 
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simply a modulus operator. LCG uses the following iterative equation to generate 
integer random values 𝑥𝑖 
𝑥𝑖+1 = (𝑎𝑥𝑖 + 𝑐) 𝑚𝑜𝑑  𝑚 (3.1) 
where, 𝑖 = 0, 1, 2, . . , 𝑛 − 1, 𝑛 is the length of cycle, 𝑥0 is the seed, 𝑎 is an integer 
multiplier and 𝑐 is an integer additive constant. m is typically a prime number. 
In the current work, the sequences of random numbers generated by LCG are 
integers and are consequently converted to its equivalent decimal number for use 
in Eureqa. In order to convert integers into their equivalent real values, the 
integral number is divided by 106 ≈ 220. The term 106 relates to the reduction 
modulo of 65536 and it specifies that five digits are selected after the decimal. It 
is possible to replace the fractional conversion process mentioned earlier to 
transform integer into the fractional in the range [0,1] by division the Equation 3.1 
by 𝑚 = 65536 [53], [54]. 
3.4.4. Atmospheric noise 
Atmospheric noise “is radio noise caused by natural atmospheric processes, 
primarily lightning discharges in thunderstorms”[55]. The randomness comes 
from atmospheric noise, and the data generated for most cases performs better in 
statistical tests for randomness than PRN algorithms. The most commonly used 
atmospheric noise system is available at www.random.org [56] that is capable 
generating either integer or real random values. Also this system is considered to 
be a chaotic and not a deterministic system [56] . 
PRNS are suitable for many purposes, but www.random.org offers true random 
numbers for use in sweepstakes and lotteries, online gaming, scientific 
applications and for art and music. It was first made available in1998 by Mads 
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Haahr of the School of Computer Science and Statistics at Trinity College, 
Dublin, Ireland, but is now operated by Randomness and Integrity Services Ltd 
[56]. 
The random number generator at www.random.org uses atmospheric noise to 
provide up to 10,000 random decimal fractions each having up to 20 decimal 
places and drawn from a uniform distribution in the interval [0, 1]. In this work, 
six decimal places are normally used and as few as five random numbers are 
generated. 
3.4.5. Eureqa software tool 
In 2009, Eureqa was first released by Hod Lipson of the Computational 
Synthesis Laboratory at Cornell University [40]. Eureqa is able to perform 
‘symbolic regression’, that is, it able to execute iterative search operations to 
determine an underlying equation that models input data. The main goal of the 
tool was to reduce the time and effort that is normally needed in generating such 
equations using trial and error [57]. An early success for Eureqa was in 
determining the basic laws of motion of a double pendulum in a few hours by 
analyzing data that described its movements [57].  
Based on the mathematical symbolic regression provided by Eureqa, hidden 
mathematical relationships between the raw data can be is discovered using a 
variety of tools. Eureqa provides access to its operations through a graphical user 
interface or an Applications Programming Interface (API). Additionally, Eureqa 
provides support for parallel operation computations over multiple computers 
[58]. In generating a model for the data that meets a user’s requirements in terms 
of specific error bounds, a range of combinations of operators and functions (such 
as geometrical and logarithmic) are attempted. In each evolutionary generation, 
Eureqa retains a population of solutions that most closely meet requirements in 
Chapter 3  Performance evaluation of the data generated 
from Eureqa 
 
31 
 
terms of accuracy with respect to the data being modelled, the population being 
passed to the next generation for further refinement [6].  
In this work, using the API available for Eureqa, amathematical equations are 
determined that model a sequence of PRNs and acts as the encryption key. In 
every encryption system, both the execution time needed to determine the 
encryption key and the security of the key are important. In practical applications, 
there is a trade-off between execution time and the security obtained. 
Consequently, investigations were carried out to determine the time taken by 
Eureqa in modelling random number sequences of different lengths, while also 
estimating the effect on the security of the keys produced. Figure 3.2 shows a 
screenshot of the Eureqa user interface operating with a population of equations to 
model a random number sequence. 
 
Figure 3.2 :The user interface of Eureqa during iterative operations 
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In the modelling of sequences of PRNs, a range of experiments were conducted 
to confirm that sufficient decimal places of the real numbers are being accurately 
modeled. In this study, two different thresholds of the Eureqa error less than 0.5 
and 5 × 10−6 are define to ensure that all the integer points are being accurately 
modelled; each must fit at an error of no more than 0.5 and 5 × 10−6 (where each 
threshold independently). The assumption here is that the resolution and accuracy 
of the computer calculations is sufficient in both the sending and receiving 
systems so that the same rounding to the nearest integer will occur in each case 
(For further details, see Chapter 5). To model 200 random numbers to this 
accuracy, more than three days was needed, a delay not acceptable for most 
practical applications. Clearly, the long calculation time can be addressed by 
choosing shorter sequences, but this is likely to adversely affect the security of the 
key produced. One of the main contributions of the current work is the 
development of approaches that reduce the execution time by using shorter 
sequences, while minimizing the impact on key security.   
3.5. Proposed system architecture 
The basic cryptographic process being considered as the application for the 
current work is shown in Figure 3.3. 
 
Figure 3.3: The basic encryption and decryption processes 
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The three main steps are required in the implementation of a cryptographic 
system are key generation, encryption and decryption. The encryption process is 
given by Equation (3.2) and Equation (3.3) is used to perform decryption. 
𝐶[𝑖] = 𝑃[𝑖] ⊕ 𝑘[𝑖] (3.2) 
𝑃[𝑖] = 𝐶[𝑖] ⊕ 𝐾[𝑖] (3.3) 
where  i = 0, 1, 2, . . , n − 1,  n is being number of values in the input plaintext 
file, 𝑃[i]  is the input plaintext, ⊕  is the exclusive-OR operator, 𝐾[𝑖]  is the 
encryption key and 𝐶[𝑖]  is the ciphertext. In Equations (3.2) and (3.3), it is 
assumed that the output test 𝑃[𝑖] is recovered without error. 
The security of a cryptosystem is mainly dependent on the quality of the 
encryption key, which in turn requires a generating mechanism that is known to 
produce secure keys. Consequently, it is important in the current work to establish 
that the mathematical equations generated in this work using Eureqa are able to 
provide suitable security for use in cryptography.  
The remainder of this section describes the work carried out to investigate the 
utility of performing cryptography using Eureqa. The approach used for 
generating keys is first described. Subsequently, a number of alternative 
approaches for generating new keys using combinations of the mathematical 
equations provided by Eureqa are investigated.   
A number of techniques have been proposed which are described in this 
chapter. They are termed Zigzag (ZZ), Extended (EX), Modified Zigzag (MZZ), 
Modified Extended (MEX) and Dual Modified Extended (DMEX).   
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3.5.1 Key generation  (g) 
The block diagram shown in Figure 3.4 illustrates the process of generating 
encryption keys using Eureqa, which is called g. However, despite having 
different approaches in how they encrypt or decrypt the data, the next block 
diagram summarizes the main steps that the approaches use in order to conclude 
to the exclusive or operation. 
 
Figure 3.4: Process of key generation (g) using Eureqa 
There are seven steps in the key generation process.  
• Step 1. Generate an initial random seed 𝑥0 to initiate process. 
• Step 2. An LCG is used to create a sequence of five integer random numbers 
[𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑥3, 𝑥4, 𝑥5] using the initial random seed 𝑥0. The generated sequence 
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arranged into columns each one including five numbers ([𝑥0, 𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑥3, 𝑥4], 
[𝑥1, 𝑥2, 𝑥3, 𝑥4, 𝑥5] ). All numbers are integers of 16 bits in order to limit 
calculation time.  
• Step 3. Transform the two integer number sequences to other sequences of 
decimal fractions by using division process by 106. It is possible to replace 
the fractional conversion process mentioned earlier to transform integer into 
fractional in range [0,1] by division of Equation (3.1) by m [53] ,[54] 
• Step 4. The two sequences of five random numbers generated in step 3 are 
used by Eureqa to generate a mathematical Equation E Equation (3.4). 
• Step 5. An example of the form of such equation produced is shown in 
Equation (3.5). 
𝑥𝑖+1 =  𝐸(𝑥𝑖) (3.4) 
𝑥𝑖+1 = 1.31529818114372 ∗ 𝑐𝑜𝑠(𝑠𝑖𝑛(1.96112968832383 
+  13.1950230564097 ∗ 𝑥𝑖
3  +  5.91951462695538
∗ 𝑥𝑖
2))  −  0.354175249768576 
−  0.0242954769282905 ∗ 𝑠𝑖𝑛(2.06110735630016 
+  6.29465036145623 ∗ 𝑥𝑖
2) 
(3.5) 
In this case,  
𝐸(𝑥𝑖) = 𝐴 ∗ cos(sin(𝐵 +  𝐷 ∗ 𝑥𝑖^3 +  𝐹 ∗ 𝑥𝑖^2))  −  𝐺 − 𝐻
∗ sin(𝐼 +  𝐽 ∗ 𝑥𝑖^2) 
 
(3.6) 
Where 𝐴, 𝐵, 𝐷, 𝐹, 𝐺, 𝐻, 𝐼, and 𝐽 are parameters generated by Eurea. 
It is clear from Equation (3.5) that there is high accuracy in Eureqa were the 
generated equation includes numbers with 14 decimal places because internally, 
Eureqa does all evaluations using double precision floating point arithmetic 
[59],[60],[6]. To make sure that all numbers are positive the absolute value 
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function is used |𝐸(𝑥𝑖)|. Also the integer part of all numbers is split and neglected 
using the fmod function, as shown in Equation (3.7). This ensures, each number is 
a positive number and less than 1.0 (only fractional part is used). 
𝑥𝑖+1 = 𝑚𝑜𝑑(𝑎𝑏𝑠|𝐸(𝑥𝑖)|) (3.7) 
• Step 6. The sequence of fractional random numbers is in the range 𝑥𝑖  ∈ [0,1]. 
is sequence will be used later to encrypt and decrypted text and images using 
the exclusive-OR operator. For this reason, can converted from fractional to 
integer by multiplying 1015 . All numbers the have 15 digits of precision 
which is called ?̅?. The reason for using 15 digits because rounding them off 
might result to generate not random number sequence. The tests presented in 
Chapter 4 shows that using 15 digits can give more random key rather than 7 
digits. (For more information see Chapter 4). 
3.5.2 Zigzag approach (ZZ) 
In the ZZ approach, a different seed is provided to three separate key 
generators, producing three different mathematical equations 𝐸1, 𝐸2 and 𝐸3 from 
Eureqa. Let the random numbers generated by the first key contain the five 
random numbers given by g1 = [𝑘0, 𝑘1, … , 𝑘4], those generated by the second key 
be g2 = [𝑘5, 𝑘6, … , 𝑘9]  and those generated by the third key be g3 =
[𝑘10, 𝑘11, … , 𝑘14].  The encryption process for the ZZ approach is then given by 
𝐶[𝑖] = 𝐾[𝑖 𝑚𝑜𝑑 15] ⊕ 𝑃[𝑖] (3.10) 
where i = 0, 1, 2, . . , n − 1.  
The block diagram shown in Figure 3.5 illustrates the ZZ algorithm 
implementation.  
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Figure 3.5: ZZ algorithm implementation 
In this manner, the random number values are applied in rotation to sets of 15 
data values from the plaintext message P[i] until all of the entries in the message 
have been encrypted. 
Note that decryption is carried out using the following formula. 
𝑃[𝑖] = 𝐾[𝑖 𝑚𝑜𝑑 15 ] ⊕ 𝐶[𝑖] (3.11) 
where  𝑖 = 0, 1, 2, . . , 𝑛 − 1. 
3.5.3 Proposed Extended (EX): 
In the EX approach, only a single equation  E1 is used to generate 100 random 
numbers. The equation is used as a key 𝑘𝑖  during the entire encryption and 
decryption. The encryption process for the proposed Extended approach is 
described as follows formula: 
Chapter 3  Performance evaluation of the data generated 
from Eureqa 
 
38 
 
𝐶[𝑖] = 𝐾[𝑖 𝑚𝑜𝑑 100] ⊕ 𝑃[𝑖] (3.12) 
where  𝑖 = 0, 1, 2, . . , 𝑛.  
The block diagram shown in Figure 3.6 illustrates the EX algorithm 
implementation. 
Each random number of 𝑘 is Exclusively-ORed with the corresponding byte of 
plaintext until the 𝑝99, i.e (𝑘0 ⊕ 𝑝0, 𝑘1 ⊕ 𝑝1,…, 𝑘99 ⊕ 𝑝99). The next byte of 
plaintext i-e., 𝑝100  will be Exclusively-ORed with the first random number of 𝑘 
(𝑘0 ⊕ 𝑝100, 𝑘1 ⊕ 𝑝101,…, 𝑘99 ⊕ 𝑝199) and it will be repeated until the in the end 
byte (𝑛) of plaintext. For the decryption operation, the same process will be 
followed but in the reverse order using follows formula. 
𝑃[𝑖] = 𝐾[𝑖 𝑚𝑜𝑑 100]  ⊕ 𝐶[𝑖] (3.13) 
• where  𝑖 = 0, 1, 2, . . , 𝑛 
p1
p0
p2
.
.
.
.
.
k100
P(i)
 
C(i)
.
.
.
.
.
g
k1
k0
k2
 
 
pn-1
 
Figure 3.6: block diagram of EX algorithm implementation 
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3.5.4 Proposed Modified Zigzag (MZZ): 
In Modified Zigzag approach, three different secret keys (𝑘1, 𝑘2 and 𝑘3) are 
generated by using three keys generators (g1, g2 and g3) to produce three different 
mathematical equations  E1 , E2  and E3  as in the previous proposed approach 
(Zigzag) using 15 random numbers. The description for the encryption proposed 
MZZ approach is as follows: 
𝐶[𝑖] = 𝐾[𝑖 𝑚𝑜𝑑 5] ⊕ 𝑃[𝑖] (3.14) 
where  𝑖 = 0, 1, 2, . . , 𝑀 × 𝑁 − 1 
The block diagram shown in Figure 3.7 illustrates the MZZ algorithm 
implementation. 
P(i)
C   (i)
C(i)
C  i)
1g
2g
 
 
 
 
3g  
 
 
Figure 3.7: block diagram of MZZ algorithm implementation 
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In first step, the Equation (3.10) is used to generated a first partially encrypted 
plaintext 𝐶[𝑖], where key generator g1  is used to generated  K1 which contains 
𝑀𝑁 element, these elements are a set of the same of five repeatable numbers, each 
random number of each random number of 𝑘1  is Exclusively-ORed with the 
corresponding plaintext until the 𝑝4  (𝑘1𝑖𝑠 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑑, 𝑘0 ⊕ 𝑝0, 𝑘1 ⊕ 𝑝1,…, 𝑘4 ⊕ 𝑝4) 
in plaintext. Furthermore, the next plaintext i.e., 𝑝5  will be Exclusively-ORed 
with the first random number of 𝑘1 until the 𝑝9 (𝑘1𝑖𝑠 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑑, 𝑘0 ⊕ 𝑝5, 𝑘1 ⊕ 𝑝6,…, 
𝑘4 ⊕ 𝑝9 ). Similarly, all remaining of the input plaintext 𝑃[𝑖] are Exclusively-
ORed with the random numbers of 𝑘1 in the same manner. 
?̇?[𝑖] = 𝐾[𝑖 𝑚𝑜𝑑 5] ⊕ 𝐶[𝑖] (3.15) 
where  𝑖 = 0, 1, 2, . . , 𝑀 − 1 
Second step the Equation 3.11 is used to generated a second partially encrypted 
plaintext ?̇?[𝑖], where key generator g2  is used to generated  K2 which contains 
𝑀 element, these elements are a set of the same of five repeatable numbers, each 
random number each random number of 𝑘2  is Exclusively-ORed with the 
corresponding encrypted input plaintext ?̇?[𝑖] in the first row (𝑘2𝑖𝑠 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑑, 𝑘0 ⊕ 𝐶0, 
𝑘1 ⊕ 𝐶1,…, 𝑘4 ⊕ 𝐶4). The next encrypted input plaintext i-e., 𝐶5 in the same row 
is Exclusively-ORed with the first random number of 𝑘2 (ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑘2𝑖𝑠 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑑, 𝑘0 ⊕
𝐶5 , 𝑘1 ⊕ 𝐶6 ,…, 𝑘4 ⊕ 𝐶9 ) and it will be repeated until the last row 
(𝑘2𝑖𝑠 𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑑, 𝑘0 ⊕ 𝐶251, 𝑘1 ⊕ 𝐶252,…, 𝑘4 ⊕ 𝐶𝑀−1).  
?̈?[𝑖] = 𝐾[𝑖 𝑚𝑜𝑑 5[⊕ ?̇?[𝑖] (3.16) 
where  𝑖 = 0, 1, 2, . . , 𝑁 − 1 
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The third step called the final encrypted plaintext, where key generator g3 is 
used to generate  K3 which contains 𝑁 element, these elements are a set of the 
same of five repeatable numbers, each random number of 𝑘3 is Exclusively-ORed 
with the corresponding encrypted input plaintext ?̇?[𝑖]. Where in the first column 
(𝑘3is used, 𝑘0 ⊕ 𝐶0̇ , 𝑘1 ⊕ ?̇?1 ,…, 𝑘4 ⊕ 𝐶4̇). The next encrypted input plaintext 
i.e., 𝑛5 in the same column is Exclusively-ORed with the first random number of 
𝑘3  ( 𝑘3 is used, 𝑘0 ⊕ 𝐶5̇, 𝑘1 ⊕ ?̇?6, … , 𝑘4 ⊕ 𝐶9̇) and continued until the last 
encrypted input plaintext i-e., 𝐶255−1 (𝑘3is used, 𝑘0 ⊕ ?̇?250, 𝑘1 ⊕ 𝑛251,…, 𝑘4 ⊕
?̇?𝑁−1) in the last column. 
In order to perform decryption, the aforementioned steps are performed in the 
reverse order. 
?̇?[𝑖] = 𝐾[𝑖 𝑚𝑜𝑑 5]  ⊕  ?̈?[𝑖] (3.17) 
𝐶[𝑖] = 𝐾[𝑖 𝑚𝑜𝑑 5] ⊕ ?̇?[𝑖] (3.18) 
𝑃[𝑖] =  𝐾[𝑖 𝑚𝑜𝑑 5] ⊕ 𝐶[𝑖] (3.19) 
3.5.5 Proposed Modified Extended (MEX): 
In MEX approach , only a single mathematical equation  E1 (i.e., secret key 𝑘𝑖) 
has been generated by using keys generator g1 . The block diagram shown in 
Figure 3.6 also illustrates the MEX algorithm implementation but with main 
difference between the EX previous explained and MEX approaches is that, EX 
approach is based on only 100 random numbers for secret key generation (g1 =
𝑘0, 𝑘1, … , 𝑘99) whereas in MEX approach a single mathematical equation  E1 (i.e., 
secret key 𝑘𝑖) is generated with only one arbitrary length of sequence of random 
numbers equals the same size of plaintext (an image or block text) of dimensions 
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M x N. The encryption process for the proposed MEX approach is described as 
follows: 
𝐶[𝑖] = 𝐾[𝑖 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑀 ∗ 𝑁] ⊕ 𝑃[𝑖] (3.20) 
where  𝑖 = 0, 1, 2, . . , 𝑀 × 𝑁 − 1 
A matrix of  𝑀𝑁 elements, is generated from the equation  E1 by using only 
one generator g1. The size of  K1 = 𝑀 ∗ 𝑁 and for plaintext (an image or block 
text) is same, so each random number of  K1 is exclusively-ORed with the 
corresponding plaintext 𝑘0 ⊕ 𝑝0, 𝑘1 ⊕ 𝑝1,…, 𝑘255 ⊕ 𝑝254…. 𝑘65024 ⊕ 𝑝65024 
For decryption operation, the same process will be followed but in the reverse 
order. 
𝑃[𝑖] = 𝐾[𝑖 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑀 ∗ 𝑁] ⊕ 𝐶[𝑖] 
(3.21) 
where  𝑖 = 0, 1, 2, . . , 𝑀 × 𝑁 − 1 
3.5.6 Proposed Dual Modified Extended (DMEX): 
The Dual Modified Extended approach (DMEX) is introduced to obtain three 
separate mathematical equations  E1 , E2  and E3 for each mathematical equation 
five PRNs are used as input to Eureqa. The block diagram shown in Figure 3.7 is 
used to illustrates the DMEX algorithm implementation but with main difference 
between the MZZ previous explained and DMEX approaches is that such 
equations can then be used to generate arbitrary lengths of sequences of random 
numbers to form keys. For plaintext (an image or block text) of dimensions M x 
N, the following M x N key matrices  K1, K2 and K3 are obtained from g1, g2 and 
g3 for forming the encrypted plaintext as described below. 
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g1 is used to generated  K1 which contains 𝑀𝑁 elements (as an M x N, matrix), 
generated from equation E1 . Each element of  K1  is exclusively-ORed in a 
pairwise manner with the corresponding element of the input plaintext 𝑃[𝑖] to 
generate a partially encrypted plaintext 𝐶[𝑖]. 
𝐶[𝑖] = 𝐾[𝑖 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑀 ∗ 𝑁] ⊕ 𝑃[𝑖] (3.22) 
where  𝑖 = 0, 1, 2, . . , 𝑀 × 𝑁 − 1 
g2  is used to generated  𝐾2 which contains 𝑀𝑁 values, has M identical rows 
where each row contains the first N values generated from equation 𝐸2 . Each 
element of  𝐾2 is exclusively-ORed in a pairwise manner with each corresponding 
element of 𝐶[𝑖] to generate a second partially encrypted plaintext ?̇?[𝑖]. 
?̇?[𝑖] = 𝐾[𝑖 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑀 ∗ 𝑁] ⊕ 𝐶[𝑖] (3.23) 
g3 is used to generated  K3 which contains 𝑀𝑁 values, has N identical columns 
where each column contains the first M values generated from equation 𝐸3. Each 
element of  𝐾3 is exclusively-ORed in a pairwise manner with each corresponding 
element of ?̈?[𝑖] to generate the final encrypted plaintext. 
?̈?[𝑖] = 𝐾[𝑖 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑀 ∗ 𝑁] ⊕ ?̇?[𝑖] (3.24) 
To implement decryption, the application of the steps simply takes place in 
reverse order. 
?̇?[𝑖] = 𝐾[𝑖 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑀 ∗ 𝑁] ⊕ ?̈?[𝑖] (3.25) 
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𝐶[𝑖] = 𝐾[𝑖 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑀 ∗ 𝑁] ⊕ ?̇?[𝑖] (3.26) 
𝑃[𝑖] = 𝐾 ⊕ 𝐶[𝑖] (3.27) 
 
3.6. Summary 
This chapter has illustrated the proposed method of this research for the new 
encryption system in terms of highlighting its architecture, and explaining its 
methodology. 
A variety of strategies as considered in this chapter have been proposed which 
are: (i) Zigzag (ZZ) in which three main generators were given separately with a 
common seed to generate three different mathematical equations; (ii) Extended 
(EX) in which only one mathematical formula was used to generate 100 random 
numbers; (iii) Modified Zigzag (MZZ) in which three separated secret keys were 
produced using three key generators to create three different mathematical 
equations in order to improve the protection as this approach performs three 
Exclusively-ORed operations;  (iv) Modified Extended (MEX) in which via using 
the generator of keys, only one equation was developed as well as only one 
arbitrary sequence of random numbers was generated equally to the same 
plaintext size (i.e. image or  text). The Dual Modified Extended (DMEX) 
Approach was added to obtain three different mathematical equations. These 
formulas can then be used to produce arbitrary lengths of random number 
sequences to generate the key for the encryption and decryption of the plaintext 
(i.e. image or text) with three ORed operation. This research has gone through a 
number of experimental stages. The descriptive methods are sequentially tested. 
The ZZ method was developed at the beginning of the research and then subject to 
evaluation (performance evaluation) by using a set of statistical tests (as discussed 
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in the next chapter). It was necessary to create a new approach each time with 
simplicity in terms of execution, short calculation time and a high level of 
security. 
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Chapter 4. Performance evaluation of the data 
generated from Eureqa  
This chapter illustrates the analysis of the number sequences that resulted from 
a Eureqa equation. The iterative sequences that were produced by Eureqa (i.e 
nonlinear) appear to be pseudo-random numbers but they are not chaotic. 
Therefore, it was necessary to evaluate whether the produced numbers are pseudo-
random numbers or not. 
The unpredictability of cryptographic numbers is often assessed by considering 
the independence of random variable sequences extracted from a population as 
well as the autocorrelation of individual sequences e.g. [61],[62],[63]and[64]. The 
randomness of the Random Number Generation (RNG) approach taken for a 
particular cryptographic application is an important consideration when assessing 
security and is important in ensuring the applicability of the Eureqa-based 
approach taken in this work. 
Since the 1960s, the problem of testing random nature of RNGs has attracted 
substantial theoretical and practical investigations. Independent values distributed 
uniformly in a finite range characterize an ideal RNG [43]. To mitigate an 
eavesdropper penetrating an encryption system using a search scheme based 
pattern approach, the sequence must be sufficiently large and sufficiently secure 
that there is only a small probability of any selected random number sequence 
matching the original sequence. 
The main advantage of testing random number generators that have been used by 
the third party for their algorithms is to guarantee their performance as well as 
their results (e.g. no spurious results). 
Chapter 4  Performance evaluation of the data generated from 
Eureqa 
 
47 
 
Blackledge recommend in [65] that it is important to perform a test on at least one 
sequence of random numbers generators and to evaluate the results. There are 
some poor random number generators that can result in errors under specific 
circumstances. It is important to mention that passing the first test and failing the 
second test can result from the same sequence. 
In order to assess whether a random number sequence generated in the current 
work are sufficiently secure for the purpose intended, a range of statistical tests 
were carried out to identify specific characteristics that may be present in the 
sequences. The specific tests carried out were as follows:  
• The chi-square [65],[63],[66] and Kolmogorov-Smirnov [65], [63],[66] tests 
are commonly-used frequency tests to compare the distribution of numbers 
that are expected to have been generated from a specific reference 
distribution.  
• The Wald–Wolfowitz run test [67] is used in order to test the hypothesis that 
the values in a sequence are mutually independent.  
• The NIST test suite [68],[69] is a statistical package of 15 tests to assess the 
randomness of arbitrarily-long binary sequences obtained from RNGs 
specifically for crypotographic applications.  
This chapter will effectively makes use of the chi-square test in order to test the 
uniform distribution, independence for the run-ups and downs and applies NIST 
test. All these tests are used to evaluate the different Eureqa approaches.  
4.1. Chi-squared test 
Pseudorandom number generators usually refer to iterative algorithms. The 
performance of these generators is based on the choice of some parameters that 
can affect the randomness of the output along with the available cycle length. For 
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quantifying the parameters with regard to the output quality, statistical tests need 
to be carried out before stating that the selected parameters are able to generate a 
random sequence [65].  
The chi-square statistical test is commonly used in cryptography in order to assess 
the performance of RNGs [70] and is specifically used in the current work to 
investigate the randomness of values obtained from a PRN. The chi-square test 
investigates statistical deficiencies by evaluating the empirical evidence in 
comparison with a null hypothesis test [62]. Equation (4.1) shows the basis for the 
chi-square test. 
𝜒𝑣
2 = ∑
(𝑂𝑖−𝐸𝑖)
2
𝐸𝑖
𝑖     (4.1) 
where 𝑂𝑖 is the observed frequency, 𝐸𝑖 is the expected frequency and 𝑣 is the 
number of degrees of freedom of the data. 
In the experiments, 10000 different sequences were generated from 10000 
equations. The conditions used for this test are as follows: the 𝛼 (critical value) at 
a significance level of 5% is used for the double-sided chi-square distribution 
having nine degrees of freedom. The null hypothesis of independence of the 
sequences is not supported if 3.325 > 𝜒2 > 16.919 [66]. These experiments were 
carried out and repeated 10000 times to investigate the accuracy of the results.  
The chi-squared tests were performed for sequences produced from a LCG 
using 14 digit values [51] and atmospheric noise from www.random.org using 
double precision numbers [56]. The results are shown in Figures 4.1 and 4.2, 
respectively. Further experiments were carried out using seven digit values from 
LCG and single precision numbers from www.random.org. The results are shown 
in Figures 5.3 and 5.4, respectively. 
Chapter 4  Performance evaluation of the data generated from 
Eureqa 
 
49 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Chi-square distribution for 10000 sequences using LCG with double 
precision. 
 
Figure 4.2: Chi-square distribution for 10000 sequences using an atmospheric with 
double precision. 
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Figure 4.3: Chi-square distribution for 10000 sequences for the LCG with single 
precision. 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Chi-square distribution for 10000 sequences of atmospheric noise with single 
precision. 
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Figure 4.1 shows that around 89.96% of the 100000 sequences for double 
precision LCG pass the chi-square test, which, supports the hypothesis that the 
sequence generated is random. The results in Figure 4.2 shows that 90% of 
sequences pass the chi-square test when atmospheric noise (www.random.org) is 
used for the generation of the first values in the sequence and where further values 
are generated as iterations progress. The results show the chi-square test fails 
more frequently when single precision sequences are used; Figure 4.3 show that 
76.28% of the experiments passed the chi-square test when LCG is supplied and 
77.2% when atmospheric noise is supplied, Figure 4.4 shows that it is likely that 
the short cycle length of sequences used in the tests that led to the 10.04% failure 
rate in passing the chi-square test. This result is unacceptable in cryptography 
[65],[71]. It is important to note that short cycle lengths lead to repetition, which 
makes algorithms resistance to brute-force attacks. Figure 4.5 displays an example 
of samples taken of a sequence generated by LCG that did not pass the chi-
squared test and displays a short sequence that is repeated. 
 
Figure 4.5: Example short cycle length of sequences as highlighted 
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4.2. Run test  
The test that is carried out helps in examining the length of the monotonic 
sequences, upwards or downwards. The length sequences are often dependent on 
the shorter runs that follow, or vice versa. For simplifying all the probabilities, 
one needs to carry out a process that throws the element which follows the run 
and makes the whole sequence independent. Finally, a Chi-squared test must be 
conducted [65]. 
Run tests are widely used to evaluate the randomness of observations. The null 
hypothesis can be stated as the values in a sequence are independent and so the 
sequence is random. 
The run test can be formulated as follows. The observations are noted in the 
order they appear and each observation is represented as + if an observation is 
greater in value that the immediately preceding observation and - otherwise. Let 
𝑎 be the number of runs, where a run is a sequence of unbroken + or – symbols. 
The value of 𝑎  should fall in a specified range to accept the hypothesis. For 
example, a run up and run down sequence is as follows 
0.41 0.68 0.89 0.94 0.74 0.91 0.55 0.62 0.36 
+ + + - + - + - 
 
In this context, N is termed as the quantity of numbers in the number sequence. 
The maximum number of runs is N-1. The minimum number of runs is taken to be 
1. a is taken to be the total number of runs under a sequence and denotes the 
variance and the mean given in  Equation (4.2) and (4.3). In order to determine the 
approximation to a normal distribution of N> 20, the independence of numbers 
can be tested from a generator with the aid of Equation (4.4). 
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The mean 𝜇𝑎 and variance 𝜎𝑎
2 of the runs test for a data sequence of 𝑁 values is 
given by 
𝜇𝑎 =
2𝑁−1
3
    (4.2) 
𝜎𝑎
2 =
16𝑁 − 29
90
 (4.3) 
The metric 𝑍0 can be obtained using  
𝑍0 =
𝑅 − 𝜇𝑎
𝜎𝑎
 
(4.4) 
where R is the number of runs. The acceptance region for the hypothesis of 
independence is obtained from |𝑍0| ≤ 𝑍α/2, where 𝑍α/2 is obtained from a table 
of standard normal distribution values for a required significance level α. 
In the experiments, 10000 sequences were produced from 10000 different 
equations generated by Eureqa for each approach. At a 5% significance level the 
null hypothesis is not supported if |𝑍0| ≤ +1.96. 
The results are shown in 4. 6 respectively for run test of sequences produced 
from the LCG with double precision. Figure 4.7 shows the result of a run test of 
sequences using atmospheric noise from www.random.org using double precision. 
Figures 4.8 and 4.9 show the result for LCG and single precision numbers from 
www.random.org and the LCG respectively. 
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Figure 4.6: Chi-square distribution for 10000 different sequences LCG with single 
precision. 
 
Figure 4.7: Run test for 10000 different sequences using an atmospheric noise with 
double precision. 
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Figure 4.8: Run test for 10000 different sequences using LCG with single precision. 
 
Figure 4.9: Run test for 10000 different sequences using an atmospheric noise with single 
precision. 
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All the sequences demonstrate the characteristic of independence regardless of 
the RNG or the number of digits of used. For sequences using LCG, with double 
precision 92.20 % and single precision 92.12% and in sequences using an 
atmospheric noise with double precision is 93.20 % single precision 92.24 %. 
4.3. NIST statistical test suite (NIST SP800-22) 
The Eureqa key generator is specifically designed for the generation of pseudo-
random numbers. However, before it can be applied in cryptography, there is a 
need to evaluate the generator. For the evaluation purpose, many different criteria 
are used, one of which is NIST.  
The NIST statistical test suite was developed by the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST) and is widely used for assessing randomness 
[69], [72]. The suite was developed with the help of many contributions made by 
a number of leading researchers in the field and is considered as the standard for 
assessing the performance of RNGs in cryptographic applications [73]. The NIST 
suite is primarily based on statistical hypothesis testing. It consists of 15 statistical 
tests, as shown in Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.1: NIST statistical tests characteristics [32] 
NIST test 
description 
NIST test description 
Frequency Equality of ones and zeroes (global) 
Block Frequency Equality of ones and zeroes in a block (local) 
Cumulative Sums Too many zeroes or ones at the start of sequences 
Longest Runs Of Ones Deviation of the distribution of long runs of ones (global) 
Runs Large (small) 
Total number of runs shows the bit stream oscillation is too 
fast (too slow) (local) 
Rank 
Deviation of the rank distribution from a corresponding 
random sequence, due to periodicity 
Spectral Periodic features in the bit stream. 
Non-overlapping 
Template Matchings 
Too many occurrences of non-periodic templates 
Overlapping Template 
Matchings 
Too many occurrences of m-bit runs of ones 
Universal Statistical Compressibility and Regularity 
Random Excursions 
Deviation from the distribution of the number 
of visits of a random walk8 to a certain state 
Random Excursion 
Variant 
Deviation from the distribution of the total number of visits 
(across many random walks) to a certain state. 
Approximate entropy Small values of ApEn(m) imply strong regularity 
Serial Non-uniform 
distribution of m-length 
words 
Similar to Approximate Entropy 
Linear Complexity 
Deviation from the distribution of the linear complexity for 
finite length (sub) strings 
 
The above-mentioned 15 tests are categorized into parametric and 
nonparametric tests and each statistical test generates P-values. The P − value ∈
 [0,1] is defined as “the probability of obtaining a test statistic as large or larger 
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than the one observed if the sequence is random” [69]. According to the NIST test 
conditions, the sequence that is being tested is considered as a random sequence if 
it passes all the different tests. However, there is a probability that it can fail at 
least one of the statistical tests even the, sequence is a true random sequence. The 
statistical tests were developed based on the presumption of the null hypothesis, 
which assumes that the sequence is random. 
In cryptographic applications, a significance level (α) is suggested by NIST, 
wherein every statistical test in the suite shows 𝛼 = 0.01. The Null hypothesis is 
acceptable when the p-value is higher than the 𝛼 -value. On the other hand, when 
the p-value is lesser than the 𝛼 -value, the alternate hypothesis is selected, thereby 
showing that the sequence was not random. Thus, for passing the NIST test, P −
value ≥ 𝛼; or else it fails the test. 
Table 4.2 shows the results of the NIST test, which was carried out by 
using a 100 sample sequence. A 106  bit sequence was tested according to the 
NIST recommendation. The earlier tests, like the Chi-squared and run tests, 
described in Sections 4.1 and 4.2 respectively, were carried out using 10,000 
different equations to generate a sequence of pseudo-random numbers that were 
produced using the Eureqa tool. However, it was a challenge to carry out the same 
number of experiments using the abovementioned statistical tests. . Furthermore, 
it must be noted that the equations used in the earlier tests like the Chi-squared 
and run tests, were not used in these statistical tests. 
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Table 4.2: NIST Statistical Test Results 
Test p-value Result 
Frequency 0.554420 Success 
Block Frequency 0.759756 Success 
Cumulative Sums 0.350485 Success 
Runs 0.897763 Success 
Longest Run 0.058984 Success 
Rank 0.779188 Success 
FFT 0.678686 Success 
Non Overlapping Template 0.595549 Success 
Overlapping Template 0.534146 Success 
Universal 0.021600  Success 
Approximate Entropy 0.595549 Success 
Random Excursions 0.122325 Success 
Random Excursions Variant 0.213309 Success 
Serial 0.699313 Success 
Linear Complexity 0.816537 Success 
 
From Table 4.2 it can be seen that the generated pseudo-random number 
sequence by Eureqa key has fully passed the NIST SP 800-22 randomness tests. 
Therefore, this generated sequence can be noted as an acceptable random 
sequence. 
The universal test is used to determine whether the sequence of random 
numbers can be substantially compressed without data loss, where a significantly 
compressible sequence of random number is considered non-random.  
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In this study, the Universal test sometimes found difficulties and in some 
experiments failed to pass this test.  This was based on the use of high length bits 
of up to 7 × 106, results that comes from using the software obtained from the 
following site https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/822/rev-1a/final 
4.4. Numerical representations 
In any given computer, the floating-point system is limited by the finite word 
length; therefore, only a finite number of numerical values can be represented 
[74]. This limits not only the range of numbers that are available, but also the 
precision with which they can be stored. 
Floating-point numbers are generally represented in a computer through three 
separate fields, namely a sign to depict whether the value is positive or negative, a 
significand that holds the digits making up the number and an exponent to 
indicate the position of the radix point [74]. The following equation shows this 
representation 
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 = (−1)𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 ∗ 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑑 ∗ (𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒)𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑛𝑡 (4.5) 
Depending on base and the number of bits required to encode different 
components, the IEEE 754 standard provides some basic formats. Among them, is 
the binary 32 known as single precision format and the binary 64 formats knows 
as double precision format in which the base is 2. Table 4.2 shows the single 
precision format representation for 32 bit significand, 8 bits for the exponent and 
1 bit for the sign. For double precision (binary digit) a format representation of 52 
bits for significance is given, 11 bits for the exponent and 1 bit for the sign. The 
bits are used as the follows. 
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Table 4.3: IEEE 754 standard format of single and double precisions 
 
Floating-Point (FP) arithmetic has a significant role in finance, science and 
engineering sectors as it allows the developers to determine the values of real 
arithmetic values. Floating-point numbers are considered as an approximation of 
real numbers; therefore, at times, this can result in inaccuracy applications for 
high accuracy applications. The round-off can be the dominating source of errors; 
this issue is critical and cannot be ignored.  
In order to reduce the rounding off error, some experiments to determine the 
effects and difficulties of 32-bit calculation vs 64-bit calculations are considered. 
This section demonstrates the evaluation of the compatibility of the curriculum, 
tested for 64-bit and 32-bit devices for both encryption and decryption.  
For the encryption of an original message, 64-bit and 32-bit devices were used. 
Note that to decrypt an encrypted message, the same key associated with the 
equation along with the initial seed is required, computed to the same precision. 
4.5. Investigation of Results for 64-bit and 32-bit 
devices 
The following steps show the results obtained.  
After the encryption is undertaken by using the initial seed and the equation, a 
sequence of random numbers was generated equal to the size of the original letter 
Format Total bits Sign Exponent Significand
Single precision 32 1 8 23
Double Precision 64 1 11 52
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(tested in Chapter 4). A 64-bit matrix is used to save these numbers.  The 𝐴64−𝑏𝑖𝑡 
is given by Equation (4.6). 
𝐴64−𝑏𝑖𝑡 =
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝑎11 
𝑎21
⋮
⋮
⋮
⋮
𝑎𝑚1
 𝑎12 
𝑎22
⋮
⋮
⋮
⋮
𝑎𝑚2
𝑎13
𝑎23
⋮
⋮
⋮
⋮
𝑎𝑚3
…
…
…
…
…
…
…
 …
…
…
…
…
…
…
 …
…
…
…
…
…
…
 𝑎1𝑛
 𝑎2𝑛
⋮
⋮
⋮
⋮
𝑎𝑚𝑛]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (4.6) 
To decrypt the previous message via a 32-bit device, the same initial seed and 
the same equation was used. The equation generated a sequence of random 
numbers saved in 𝐵32−𝑏𝑖𝑡. The 𝐵32−𝑏𝑖𝑡 is given by Equation (4.7). 
𝐵32−𝑏𝑖𝑡 =
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝑏11
𝑏21
⋮
⋮
⋮
⋮
𝑏𝑚1
 𝑏12 
𝑏22
⋮
⋮
⋮
⋮
𝑏𝑚2
𝑏13
𝑏23
⋮
⋮
⋮
⋮
𝑏𝑚3
…
…
…
…
…
…
…
 …
…
…
…
…
…
…
 …
…
…
…
…
…
…
 𝑏1𝑛
 𝑏2𝑛
⋮
⋮
⋮
⋮
𝑏𝑚𝑛]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (4.7) 
The subtraction process produces a new matrix on given by Equation (4.7). 
The subtractive process was performed and was made to ensure whether values in 
arrays 𝐴64−𝑏𝑖𝑡 and 𝐵32−𝑏𝑖𝑡 are equal. To assess the accuracy, this method tested 
the encryption and decryption over 1,000 times. The results showed that when 
two different devices were used for encryption and decryption processes, the 
results never generated a zero matrix.  
[𝐴64−𝑏𝑖𝑡] − [𝐵32−𝑏𝑖𝑡] ≠ [0] (4.8) 
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In addition to this, 32-bit float has 24 bits in the fraction which can be obtained 
by calculating 𝑙𝑜𝑔10(2
24) ≈ 7.22 whereas, the 64-bit float has 53 bits in fraction 
which can be calculated on 𝑙𝑜𝑔10(2
53) ≈ 15.9. 
4.6. Summary 
In this chapter, Eureqa used two different random number sources; a Linear 
Congruential Generator (LCG) and atmospheric noise from www.random.org to 
generate long sequences of numbers. The values produced by the Eureqa key 
generator have been tested by a series of different tests to make sure that the 
sequences obtained had uniformity and independence.  
First the chi-squared and run tests were performed to investigate the 
randomness for sequences of numbers using single and double precision. The 
results for the uniformity were high when using double precision when the 
sources consisted of LCG or atmospheric noise. It must be noted that the 
uniformity in the results was low when single precision was used. All the 
sequences obtained had high independence. 
The distribution quality of the random sequence was evaluated in this chapter 
by using the NIST test suite, considered as a standard test for cryptographic 
applications. The results shown that the number of sequences obtained by Eureqa 
passed the NIST tests. This confirms that the number sequence had random 
characteristics.  
Two different computer architecture for 32-bit and 64-bit were applied study 
the effect of using two different devices in the encryption and decryption 
processes. The result shows that using two different devices in encryption and 
decryption do not allow the retrieval of the original message. Tests also concluded 
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that it is necessary to use the same length of the word for the devices during both 
the encryption and decryption process. 
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Chapter 5. Practical Application of the Proposed 
Encryption Methods 
There are many different approaches that can be taken in order to automatically 
generate keys. However, for high security applications (such as military, research 
facilities and critical infrastructure facilities), end users may require control over 
the key generation process, rather than leaving this to third parties. In this chapter, 
both decryption and encryption keys are the equation obtained from the 
evolutionary computing tool, Eureqa, in its modelling of pseudo-random input 
data. The key generation method was introduced by Blackledge et al. [8], who 
demonstrated that the approach has the potential to produce keys that are able to 
provide security of similar strength to that offered by existing methods. The secret 
keys obtained using this technique, when applied to encryption and decryption of 
data files, were validated using a range of tests, relating to encryption and 
decryption time, throughput, entropy analyses and key sensitivity. The results 
obtained from experiments show that the proposed encryption and decryption 
approaches are both reliable and secure when applied to text files, and have the 
potential to be applied in high-security text communication applications. 
This chapter first describes the experiments undertaken to generate an 
encryption key. Section 5.2 presents the security and statistical analysis results, 
while the conclusions are reported in Section 5.3. 
5.1. Experiments in generating encryption keys 
In the initial experiments, all the calculations were carried out on an Intel i7 
computer, running a 64-bit Windows operating system, clock speed is 3.4 GHZ, 
with 3.5 GB RAM. In these experiments, Eureqa performed an evolutionary 
search to determine an equation to model integer values in a sequence of PRNs. 
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To ensure that all the integer points were accurately modelled, the error of fit must 
be less than 0.5. The requirement here is that the resolution of the computer 
calculations of both the sending and receiving systems, which may be 
architecturally different, is such that the result of the rounding (to the nearest 
integer) will be the same for both systems. 
A typical example of a non-linear equation generated by Eureqa to represent an 
encryption key is shown below. It is important to note that a different equation 
will be generated by Eureqa each time it is executed, even though it may be 
attempting to model an identical sequence of data values. 
𝑥𝑖+1 = 1.31529818114372 ∗ 𝑐𝑜𝑠(𝑠𝑖𝑛(1.96112968832383 
+  13.1950230564097 ∗ 𝑥𝑖
3  +  5.91951462695538
∗ 𝑥𝑖
2))  −  0.354175249768576 
−  0.0242954769282905 ∗ 𝑠𝑖𝑛(2.06110735630016 
+  6.29465036145623 ∗ 𝑥𝑖
2) 
(5.1) 
The next section shows the results of several experiments to determine the 
calculation time, generate an acceptable key and meet the maximum error 
requirement. 
Experiment 1 The following LCG was used to generate a PRN sequence of 
200 three-digit values, with an initial value of  𝑥0 = 131 
𝑥𝑖+1 = (13𝑥𝑖 + 111)𝑚𝑜𝑑 997; (5.2) 
where 𝑖 = 0,1,2,3…… .199  
A series of 100 experiments conducted using the PRN sequence described in 
Equation (5.2). The results shows that only the first experiment was successful in 
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that it was able to model all the values in the sequence (the Eureqa model 
exhibited a maximum error of less than 0.5). However, over 36 hours of 
calculation time were needed to produce this result; a time too long for most 
practical uses. From the set of 100 experiments, none of the other tests produced a 
successful model and all experiments were discontinued after a suitable period of 
time had passed, given that no clear further convergence was apparent. It can be 
seen that using this method, there is no guarantee that a key will be successfully 
produced, or that the key will be generated in a reasonable time.  
A second set of 100 experiments was carried out in which the length of the 
sequence was reduced to 10 values. In this case, 30 of the 100 experiments were 
successful in converging to a suitable Eureqa model, while the calculation time 
has been considerably reduced. The calculation time may now be sufficiently 
small for some practical uses. To prevent the pursuit of unfruitful avenues of 
investigation, it is prudent to establish an upper bound on the acceptable 
calculation time; a period after which the computations would be abandoned and 
the process restarted. 
Experiment 2 The following LCG was used to generate a PRN sequence of 200 
five-digit values, with an initial value of 𝑥0 = 131 
𝑥𝑖+1 = (25173𝑥𝑖 + 13849) 𝑚𝑜𝑑  65536 (5.3) 
where, 𝑖 = 0, 1, 2, . . ,199.    
This LCG was described by Mark et al. [54] with the specific intention of 
being capable of generating long cycles of random values. In the current 
implementation, Eureqa generated models from a sequence of 200 PRNs; the 
results are shows that the maximum error was substantially larger than that 
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required for any practical purpose, and little evidence of convergence was 
observed even though the calculations were allowed to proceed for an extended 
period of time. The allowed values in the sequences produced by the PRN in 
Equation (5.3) range from 0 to 65535. It became apparent in the experiments that 
the Eureqa model calculation time performance generally worsened as the PRN 
range was increased.  
As was discussed in chapter 1, the main objectives of these experiments is 
meeting the aim of suitability for practical application and to generate a key that is 
acceptable and that the maximum error requirement is met. Consequently, the set 
of experiments described below focussed on reducing the calculation time by 
decreasing the length of the sequence, although the author is aware of the 
implications this may have in terms of reducing security. The new experiments 
have been done when the allowed range of the values generated in Equation (5.4) 
was reduced to five PRNs only. In order to provide a fair and final judgment on 
the validity of the use of only five PRNs, 1000 six digit experiments were carried 
out. The results showed that 97% of experiments produced an acceptable 
maximum error. On the other hand, restricting the PRN range has significantly 
reduced both the maximum error and the calculation time. These results are 
considered the starting point of the research. 
For the maximum error requirement set at 5 × 10−6, experiments were applied 
to fractional numbers. Satisfactory results were obtained, where five fractional 
numbers in the range (0,1) with 5 decimal places were generated using a random 
decimal fraction generator from atmospheric noise using https://www.random.org. 
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5.2. Security analysis for the encryption of text 
In generating the required equations to perform the encryption and decryption 
processes, a quad-core Intel i5 CPU with 64-bit architecture with 3.5 GB RAM 
was used running the CentOS operating system [release 6.8 (final)] [41]. In these 
experiments, text files of a range of lengths were used as test data. The statistical 
properties of relevance to the quality of encryption were then obtained, 
specifically randomness, entropy, key sensitivity, execution time, and throughput.  
Shannon in 1949 [72] commented that, ‘It is possible to solve many kinds of 
ciphers by statistical analysis and a good cipher should be robust against any 
statistical attack’. To show the robustness and effectiveness of the new 
approaches, results obtained from an array of statistical tests are considered 
below. 
 
5.2.1. Chi-squared test 
The Chi-square test, which is explained in Chapter 4, is only reliable when the 
number sequence is sufficiently large. However, the random number sequence in 
the ZZ and MZZ approaches is only five digits, which would generally be 
considered far too small for investigation using a Chi-square test and so it was not 
applied to these approaches. Consequently, it cannot be claimed that the author 
has been able to demonstrate that the ZZ and MZZ approaches have a uniform 
distribution and so be able to assess their ability to be robust in the face of 
statistical attacks (Section 6.1).  Only a weaker claim can be made, that is that the 
MEX and DMEX encrypted sequences were obtained from similar algorithms to 
those used for ZZ and MZZ and when submitted for uniformity testing were 
found to give satisfactory results (see Section 4.1). 
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5.2.2. Key sensitivity 
In both encryption and decryption processes, an encryption algorithm should 
have the ability to provide high sensitivity in contrast to the value of the secret 
key [75]. Under the encryption process, high sensitivity usually means that 
following a minor change to the key, a distinct encrypted (text file) is made 
available [76].  Using a text file of length 1 kB, Tables 5.1 to 5.5 show examples 
of key sensitivity tests for all the new approaches.  
Table 5.1:  ZZ key sensitivity tests 
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Table 5.2: EX key sensitivity tests 
 
Table 5.3 MZZ key sensitivity tests 
 
 
 
 
 
Position change Process Entropy
Plaintext Plaintext 4.823
Encryption 7.69423
Decryption 4.823
Encryption 7.6942
Decryption 7.7412
Encryption 7.69423
Decryption 7.76025
Encryption 7.69423
Decryption 6.74829
seed
change one bit in one parameter in the 
equation
one parameter changed
no change
Position change Process Entropy
Plaintext Plaintext 4.823
Encryption 7.6851
Decryption 4.823
Encryption 7.6851
Decryption 7.7141
Encryption 7.6851
Decryption 7.7213
Encryption 7.6851
Decryption 7.6849
no change
one parameter is changed
change one bit in one parameter in the 
equation
seed
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Table 5.4 MEX key sensitivity tests 
 
Table 5.5 DMEX key sensitivity tests 
 
In the ZZ approach in Table 5.1, the value of entropy is low compared to the 
other approaches. The low entropy values are due to employing short sequences 
of numbers that repeats. From Table 5.1 it is clear that, an intruder without access 
to the seed or key almost certainly cannot retrieve the original message. In the 
second case, where the intruder has obtained the correct seed but not exactly the 
Position changechange Process Entropy
Plaintext Plaintext 4.823
Encryption 7.7851
Decryption 4.823
Encryption 7.7851
Decryption 7.7844
Encryption 7.7851
Decryption 7.7843
Encryption 7.7851
Decryption 7.7841
seed
change one bit in one parameter in the 
equation
one parameter is changed
no change
Position change Process Entropy
Plaintext Plaintext 4.823
Encryption 7.8421
Decryption 4.823
Encryption 7.8356
Decryption 7.8124
Encryption 7.8356
Decryption 7.751
Encryption 7.8356
Decryption 7.7851
Encryption 7.8356
Decryption 7.7792
Encryption 7.8356
Decryption 7.9521
change one bit in one parameter in the 
equation
one parameter is changed
no change
Seed1
Seed2
Seed3
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correct equation (one bit in one parameter of the equation or one parameter has 
been changed), it would be possible to obtained some characters of the original 
message.  What was observed in the ZZ approach also occurred in both EX and 
MZZ approaches (Tables 5.2 and 5.3 respectively), the results showing a slightly 
reduced entropy when there is any change made to the equation.  
The results in Tables 5.4 and 5.5 show that MEX and DMEX both have high 
sensitivity to the secret key. Indeed, no characters in the plaintext file can be 
recovered following a change to only one bit in one parameter of the decryption 
key equation.  
5.2.3. Entropy  
To evaluate the random nature of the output values generated by an encryption 
algorithm, entropy can be used. It can be measured by the following equation 
𝐻(𝑠) = ∑ 𝑃(𝑠𝑖) log2
1
𝑃(𝑠𝑖) 
   
2𝑀−1
𝑖=0
  ,                                                      (5.4) 
where the probability of being in state 𝑠𝑖 is represented by 𝑃(𝑠𝑖), and the total 
number of states is 2𝑀. A comparison of the entropy values for the new approach 
compared to other state-of-the-art algorithms is shown in the Table 5.6. 
The high values of entropy for the MEX and DMEX technique does indicate 
that these techniques can be used as robust and effective methods against a range 
of entropy attacks. The blend of high entropy and high chi-squared test values 
(obtained below), for MEX and DMEX indicates that the approach used in this 
research provides security of a similar standard compared to existing encryption 
algorithms.  
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Table 5.6:  Entropy values obtained for a range of proposed encryption methods (section  
3.5 ) and the popular encryption methods DES and AES 
 
5.2.4. Execution time and throughput 
Encryption and decryption time and throughput are very important in 
evaluating the practical usability of encryption algorithms [77] [78]. Encryption 
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time is defined as the time that an encryption algorithm takes to generate 
ciphertext from plaintext [29]. Decryption time is the time taken for decryption 
and throughput is calculated by dividing the number of bytes in the plaintext 
message by the time taken to encrypt the plaintext [79]. In generating the results 
in this work, each test file was encrypted and decrypted 1000 times on CentOS 
operating system release 6.8 with a quad-core Intel i5 CPU, 64-bit architecture 
and 3.5 GB RAM and the results are presented in Table 5.7. The throughput 
comparison for the encryption and decryption process is presented in Figure 5.1 
for ZZ, EX, MZZ, MEX and DMEX approaches. Figure 5.2 shows the throughput 
comparison for the encryption and decryption process between MEX and DMEX, 
and the literature for the existing algorithms DES and AES. 
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Table 5.7 : Execution time for the encryption and decryption processes for the new and existing encryption methods 
 
 
Enc Dec Enc Dec Enc Dec Enc Dec Enc Dec Enc Dec Enc Dec
0.05 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.0817 0.0803 0.0476 0.0423 0.044 0.047 0.018 0.013
0.1 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0005 0.0005 0.0895 0.0865 0.0952 0.0901 0.082 0.0963 0.034 0.031
0.5 0.0021 0.0024 0.0023 0.0022 0.0023 0.0024 0.092 0.0906 0.696 0.673 0.398 0.4052 0.116 0.115
1 0.0049 0.005 0.0055 0.0045 0.0056 0.0058 0.097 0.0994 1.392 1.3931 0.807 0.7996 0.234 0.221
10 0.0301 0.0322 0.0354 0.0344 0.0412 0.0433 0.233 0.233 13.7603 13.8497 8.175 8.288 2.442 2.431
20 0.0621 0.0623 0.0612 0.0614 0.0821 0.0811 0.423 0.425 27.5112 27.6994 15.708 15.704 4.326 4.563
30 0.1251 0.1246 0.1289 0.1351 1.439 1.435 0.6348 0.6364 42.0337 41.9387 23.997 23.777 6.731 6.843
Mean time 0.0321 0.0324 0.0334 0.034 0.2244 0.224 0.2359 0.2359 12.2194 12.2409 7.0301 7.0167 1.9859 2.031
File length 
(MB)
Execution time for encryption and decryption (s)
ZZ EX MZZ MEX DMEX DES AES
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Figure 5.1: Comparison of the throughput of all the encryption algorithms 
 
Figure 5.2: More detailed comparison of the encryption algorithms with lower throughputs 
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AES and DES generally perform poorly in the throughput experiments as they 
require that a number of encryption and decryption operations are performed. For 
AES, the required number of processing cycles depends on the key length; 
typically 10 cycles for 128-bit keys, 12 for 192-bit keys and 14 for 256-bit keys 
[80]. In each encryption cycle, four separate operations are required, namely byte 
substitution, shifting, combining columns and the addition of rounded keys 
(except in the final stage) [80]. During decryption, the inverse of these operations 
needs to be executed. DES normally encrypts data in 64-bit blocks and operates 
on a key length of 56 bits [81]. A total of 16 cycles is required, each involving a 
combination of ‘confusion’ and ‘diffusion’ [81].  
Figure 5.1 shows that the ZZ approach has the highest rate of throughput 
compared to both the new approaches and to the traditional symmetric algorithms. 
This is because five random numbers are generated only once, and each plaintext 
item is exclusively-ORed only once with one of these numbers, making the 
encryption and decryption time very short compared with other approaches as 
shown in Table 5.7. It can be seen in the same table that the throughput of the EX 
approach is slightly less than the ZZ approach, as the EX approach needs 100 
random numbers for the exclusively-ORed process. The encryption and 
decryption time in the MZZ approach is more than six times that of the ZZ 
approach. This is due to the different encryption algorithm styles used where in 
the ZZ approach the Exclusively-ORed operation is used only once the while with 
the MZZ approach performs with three Exclusively-ORed operation, which 
enhances the security. It is important to remember that because the ZZ, EX and 
MZZ approaches have short cycle lengths. (meaning that the sequence is repeated 
more frequently), this has a negative effect on the strength of the algorithms’ 
resistance to brute-force attacks.  
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Figure 5.2 provides a higher resolution comparison between the AES and DES 
block ciphers and the DMEX and MEX approaches. The MEX approach has a 
considerably higher throughput than the other methods shown in Figure 5.2, 
principally because it requires only two simple steps, namely key generation 
followed by encryption (or decryption if appropriate). In key generation, a single 
mathematical equation (being the secret key) is generated to provide a random 
number sequence of length equal to that of the plaintext and encryption is the 
exclusive-ORing of the random numbers with the corresponding plaintext values. 
DMEX takes longer as it is necessary to divide the plaintext into a set of blocks 
using three separately-generated mathematical equations before applying the 
exclusive-OR operations. 
5.2.5. Key space 
Considering Kerckhoff’s encryption rules, the degree of security provided 
relies principally on the quality of the key [82]. The computational processing 
power of modern computer systems raises the possibility of an attacker being able 
determine an encryption key using a trial and error approach [83],[84]. One 
important issue to minimize the possibility of such an attack is to ensure that the 
length of the encryption key itself makes it statistically unlikely that it can be 
found using brute force within a reasonable time. The total number of different 
keys that can be generated by a particular method indicates its resistance to trial 
and error attacks [83], [84], and, according to one report, must be larger than 2128 
in order to provide sufficient resistance to brute-force attacks [85]. 
In the proposed algorithm MEX, the actual number of variables involved in its 
calculation changes each time the mathematical equation is generated. The 
equation generated by Eureqa contains a minimum of four parameters, each of 
double precision, providing a resolution of around 10−14. Therefore, in the MEX 
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encryption process, the key space can be determined by considering the resolution 
of the initial seed x0 and the four parameters, given by 
𝐾 = {𝑥0, 𝐴, 𝐵, 𝐶, 𝐷}; (5.5) 
𝐾 = 10 6 × 1014 × 10 14 × 10 14 × 10 14 = 10 62 ≈ 2206; (5.6) 
Such a key space value is likely to give sufficient security against brute-force 
attacks. In the DMEX algorithm, three different equations are used with three 
initial seeds, which leads to a further factor of three increase in the key space 
value. 
5.3. Summary 
In this chapter, the ZZ, EX, MZZ, MEX and DMEX approaches that allow 
users to control the generation of encryption keys have been investigated in terms 
of effectiveness in their application to text encryption. In order to determine how 
the candidate approaches perform when a potential eavesdropper attempts to 
attack the system, an array of statistical tests were performed, namely entropy, 
key sensitivity and key space analysis. In addition, performance has been 
investigated using execution time and throughput. The results showed clear 
defects in ZZ, EX and MZZ approaches that, despite the high entropy values, 
highlighted that these approaches as are not well suited to practical applications. 
In contrast, the results also showed that the MEX and DMEX approaches 
displayed results of similar quality in terms of security to those found in the 
literature for popular existing algorithms. Specifically, both MEX and DMEX 
exhibited high entropy values indicating that they are secure in the face of 
entropy-based attacks and their key space is sufficiently large to be resilient to 
brute-force attacks. Further, the proposed MEX and DMEX approaches were also 
shown to be sensitive to small changes to the secret key values as well as being 
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resilient to anti-differential attacks. However, the MEX method exhibited a high 
throughput, whereas the DMEX method had a relatively low throughput. 
Consequently, as the MEX approach provides both high security and high 
throughput, it is the most effective of the new methods investigated for the secure 
transmission of private and confidential information.  
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Chapter 6. Encryption of Image Files using a User-
controlled Automatically-generated Key 
Traditional symmetrical cryptographic algorithms are generally able provide an 
adequate degree of immunity to attacks that aim to reveal secret keys. In this 
chapter, keys for both image encryption and decryption are obtained using the 
evolutionary computing tool Eureqa in its modelling of pseudo-random data. As 
discussed in earlier chapters, this approach has the advantage of giving users 
control of the key generation process. The keys generated by this approach for use 
in the encryption and decryption of gray-scale images are validated in a range of 
statistical tests, namely histogram, chi-square, correlation of adjacent pixel pairs, 
correlation between original and encrypted images, entropy and key sensitivity. 
These tests are used to investigate the robustness of algorithms' and evaluating 
effectiveness of the new approaches, against any some typical attacks such as 
statistical attack, brute force attacks, entropy attacks and Key sensitivity attacks 
[86]. Experimental results obtained from these methods are used to propose an 
image encryption and decryption algorithm that is both secure and reliable, and 
which has the potential to be adapted for use in high-security image 
communication applications. 
As is well known each encryption algorithm is specifically designed for a 
particular type of digital data, like audio, texts or image data files. The text and 
image digital data files display completely different characteristics. This is 
attributed to the fact that images depict a large amount of correlated data. 
Furthermore, the data presented in image files contains high redundancy.  
Owing to these differences, an approach needs to be evaluated for a different 
type of data file like image files. In this study, the above-mentioned approach was 
tested using a set of popular standard grayscale test images used to validate the 
encryption and decryption process which are Lena, cameraman, Baboon, Peppers, 
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House and Splash images. It was difficult to obtain results in research papers 
containing all standard test images. 
This chapter consists of two principal sections: Section 6.1 presents the 
security and statistical analysis results, while a conclusion to the work is provided 
in Section 6.2. 
6.1. Statistical and Security Analysis 
A quad-core Intel i5 CPU with 64-bit architecture 3.5 GB RAM, running under 
CentOS operating system [41] [release 6.8 (final)] was used to generate the 
equations from Eureqa and perform both the encryption and decryption processes. 
In the experiments, gray-scale images of resolution 256×256 and of 8-bit depth 
were used as test data. Statistical properties of relevance to encryption quality 
were then obtained, namely histogram, chi-square and entropy analyses. Key 
security was also investigated. 
6.1.1. Histogram Analysis  
Normally, the histogram estimates the probability distribution of discrete 
variables and a bar chart is used to depict the distribution of a set of data [87]. In 
the context of image processing technology, it normally describes the pixel 
intensity values of an image [88]; the histogram being a graphical representation 
of pixels contained in an image for the different intensity values found in that 
image [87]. For an n-bit image, there are 2𝑛 different possible intensities. 
The performance of an image encryption algorithm can be assessed by how 
closely the histogram of the cipher image conforms to a uniform distribution 
[89],[90],[91]. On an original Lena image (“ one of a standard test image widely 
used in the field of image processing” [92] downloaded from [93]) an initial 
investigation of security was carried out using the ZZ approach and it was found 
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that the encrypted results were not good due to the shorter key lengths. In fact, 
subjectively it was normally possible to extract much of the detail of the original 
image by viewing only the encrypted image, as can be seen in Figure 6.1. Using 
histogram analysis of the encrypted Lena images, a highly non-uniform histogram 
distribution was obtained, as shown in Figure 6.1 (d). For good security, it is 
expected that the histogram of the encrypted image will be uniform [89],[90],[91] 
and these results show that image encryption using the ZZ approach is not 
acceptable. 
 
Figure 6.1: Histograms of original and ZZ encrypted images 
(a) Original Lena image (b)   histogram of Lena image 
(d) Histogram of ZZ cipher image (c) ZZ Encrypted image 
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For the proposed EX approach, the original Lena image and the encrypted 
image are shown in Figure 6.2 (a) and Figure 6.2 (c), respectively. The respective 
non-uniform histogram analysis is shown in Figure 6.2 (b) and Figure 6.2 (d). 
Although the histogram of the data encrypted using EX appears more uniform 
than in than in the ZZ case, the encrypted image retains some details that are 
discernible to the naked eye, making EX unsuitable for practical purposes. 
 
Figure 6.2: Histograms of original and EX encrypted images 
(a) Original Lena image (b)   histogram of Lena image 
(d) Histogram of EX cipher image (c) EX Encrypted image 
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The experimental results demonstrate that the proposed ZZ and EX approaches 
are not appropriate for use in secure environments, such as when uploading or 
downloading image files on cloud networks. The reason for the poor performance 
of these methods is likely to be that the cycle lengths of the number generators 
used in ZZ and EX approaches are much shorter than the horizontal resolution 
used in the image. As the pixels are spatially separated by a number of pixels 
equal to the sequence length, which are encrypted using the same value, there is 
visually perceptibility; at a lower resolution, representation of the original image 
remains following encryption. To avoid the retention of this detail, cryptographic 
schemes with greater security, perhaps using encryption sequences of 
considerably greater length, need to be investigated.  
The encrypted images and the histograms for the Lena original image are 
shown in Figures 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5 for the MZZ, MEX and DMEX approaches 
respectively.  
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Figure 6.3: MZZ encrypted image and its histogram 
(a) Original Lena image (b)   histogram of Lena image 
(d) Histogram MZZ cipher image (c) MZZ Encrypted image 
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Figure 6.4 MEX encrypted image and its histogram 
(a) Original Lena image (b)   histogram of Lena image 
(d) Histogram MEX cipher image (c) MEX Encrypted image 
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Figure 6.5: DMEX encrypted image and its histogram 
On visual inspection, the MZZ distribution in Figure 6.3 (b) appears to be less 
uniform in nature than both the MEX distribution in Figure 6.4 (b) and the DMEX 
distribution in Figure 6.5 (b) both appear close to a uniform distribution.  
To provide resistance to access of information by attackers, it is important to 
ensure that the original and encrypted images are statistically different [94]. 
Furthermore, as shown in the figures above, the histograms of the original images 
(a) Original Lena image (b)   histogram of Lena image 
(d) Histogram DMEX cipher image (c) DMEX Encrypted image 
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(is shown in Figure 6.1 (b)) exhibit a number of peaks and troughs, whereas the 
histograms of the encrypted images for MEX and DMEX are relatively uniform, 
implying significantly differences in the statistical natures of the distributions 
before and following encryption and making these methods particularly immune 
from statistical attack. 
6.1.2. Chi-squared test  
The uniformity between the outputs obtained from an encryption algorithm can 
be assessed by the chi-squared test given by  
𝜒2 = ∑
(𝑣𝑖 − 𝑁)
2
𝑁
𝑁
𝑖=1
     ,                                                  (6.1) 
where, for the current application, 𝑣𝑖  represents the frequency of occurrence of 
each of the N gray-scale values. In the literature, it is reported that the lower the 
chi-squared value 𝜒
2
obtained, then the more uniform is the distribution of the 
image, indicating a higher degree of resistance from statistical attacks [95]. 
Comparison of proposed MZZ, MEX and DMEX approaches with the state-of-
the-art in terms of chi-square is also presented by using a set of popular standard 
test images in Table 6.1. 
Table 6.1 Comparison of chi-squared values obtained for a range of images 
 
The table also compares the performance of MZZ, MEX and DMEX with three 
state-of-the-art key generation methods; the first [96] and  the second  [97] using a 
Chaos Chaos
[96]  [97]
Lena 41145 1038 241 258 182 263
Cameraman 113650 2696 274 291 234 257
Baboon 107480 5206 233 289 241 266
Peppers 36778 1001 263 282 218 274
House 299790 7312 283 285 255 260
Splash 86024 1556 284 294 211 271
All zero 16711680 661660 243 306 220 290
Image 
Encryption method
Original 
image
MZZ MEX DMEX
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technique based on chaos. It can be seen that the MEX and DMEX approach 
exhibits a chi-square test value that is comparable with those found in the other 
recent approaches. However, MZZ produced relatively large chi-squared values, 
indicating lower randomness, as was indicated by the previous histogram test.  
6.1.3. Correlation between the original and the encrypted images 
This statistical test is used to assess in a quantitative manner the difference 
between two images. The correlation between an original image A and an 
encrypted image B can be determined from equation 6.3 [90]. 
𝜌 = ∑∑(𝐴𝑖𝑗 − ?̅?)(𝐵𝑖𝑗 − ?̅?)
𝑁
𝑗=1
𝑀
𝑖=1
√(∑∑(𝐴𝑖𝑗 − ?̅?)
2
𝑁
𝑗=1
𝑀
𝑖=1
)(∑∑(𝐵𝑖𝑗 − ?̅?)
2
𝑁
𝑗=1
𝑀
𝑖=1
)⁄  
(6.2) 
𝐴 =
1
𝑀𝑁
∑∑𝐴𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1
𝑀
𝑖=1
     and      𝐵 =
1
𝑀𝑁
∑∑𝐵𝑖𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1
𝑀
𝑖=1
 
where, 𝐴 is the original image (plain image), 𝐵 is the encrypted image, ?̅? and ?̅? 
are the mean values of ?̅? and ?̅?.  𝑀 the height and 𝑁 the width of plain image and 
encrypted image. 
The results obtained are shown in Table 6.3. Values of ρ close to unity are 
obtained for image pairs that are similar, and values near zero indicate little 
similarity between images.  
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Table 6.2: Comparison of encryption quality using correlation 
 
As shown in Table 6.3, the correlation values ρ for EX, DMEX and those 
published in [96] are [97] are similar. Again, the encryption performance of 
DMEX can be seen to be similar to that of other modern approaches. Also, the 
table shows there is a slight rise in the value of a correlation between the original 
and cipher-images in the MZZ approach. 
6.1.4. Entropy measurement 
Entropy can be used to assess the random nature of the output values produced 
by an encryption algorithm [96] [76], and can be calculated using 
𝐻(𝑠) = ∑ 𝑃(𝑠𝑖) log2
1
𝑃(𝑠𝑖) 
   
𝐿−1
𝑖=0
                               (6.4)  
where 𝑃(𝑠𝑖) represents the probability of being in state 𝑠𝑖  and 𝐿 = 2
𝑀  is the 
total number of states of the message source 𝑀=8 in gray image. A comparison of 
the entropy of the approaches with other state-of-the-art algorithms is presented in 
Table 6.4. 
 
 
MZZ MEX DMEX Ref [96] Ref [97]
Lena -0.0324 -0.0018 0.0032 0.00015 0.0034
Cameraman -0.0214 -0.0043 0.0063 0.0003 0.0015
Baboon -0.0266 0.0009 0.00045 0.0025 −0.0007
Peppers -0.0274 -0.0001 0.0046 0.0042 0.0024
House -0.0063 0.006 -0.0021 0.0008 −0.0028
Splash -0.0345 0.004 0.0007 0.0002 −0.0033
Image name
          Correlation between original and encrypted images
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Table 6.3: Comparison of entropy values for a range of encryption methods 
 
The high values of entropy for the MEX and DMEX approaches (close to the 
maximum value of eight), indicates that these approaches are robust against 
entropy attacks. The combination of high entropy and high chi-squared test value 
obtained for MEX and DMEX indicates that these approaches provide similar 
security to other modern encryption algorithms. As is known, the entropy for the 
original black image is zero because there is no difference between any two 
adjacent pixels [97]. The MZZ approach has an almost as high value of entropy as 
the best performing methods in all except the ‘all zero’ [98],[87] image where the 
entropy value dropped significantly to reach to 4.56205. The low entropy is due to 
no large change in adjacent pixel correlations. Consequently, the MZZ approach 
cannot resist a chosen-plain-text attack. Also as shown in Table 6.1, the values of 
chi-square are very high, which means that this approach can be considered to be 
inadequate. 
6.1.5.  Key Sensitivity  
During both the encryption and decryption processes, an encryption algorithm 
should provide high sensitivity with respect to changes in the value of the secret 
key[100],[101]. For encryption, high sensitivity means that a substantially 
different encrypted image is obtained when there are only a minor changes made 
to the key and it should not be possible to fully or even partially retrieve the 
Ref Ref
[96] [97]
Lena 7.4423 7.98844 7.99715 7.9992 7.998 7.9977
Cameraman 6.9754 7.97066 7.99679 7.997 7.9974 7.9969
Baboon 7.9951 7.94222 7.99684 7.9974 7.9973 7.9971
Peppers 7.5347 7.98897 7.99689 7.9971 7.9976 7.9973
House 6.4975 7.92315 7.99685 7.9969 7.9972 7.9972
Splash 7.2933 7.98318 7.99676 7.9969 7.9977 7.9965
All zero 0 4.56205 7.99663 7.9973 7.9976 7.9977
Image 
Encryption method
Original 
image
MZZ MEX DMEX
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original image should a small change be made to the encryption key [76]. The 
images obtained during key sensitivity tests for MEX are shown in Figure 6.7, and 
DMEX are shown in Figure 6.8. 
 
Figure 6.6: MEX sensitivity analysis results 
(a) Original Lena image (b) DEX encrypted image  
(d) changed	first	equa/ on	 (c) changed seed 
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Figure 6.7: DMEX sensitivity analysis results
(b) DMEX encrypted image  
(f) changed first equation 
(a) Original Lena image (c) changed first seed (d) changed second seed 
(e) changed third seed (g) changed second equation (h) changed third equation  
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The encrypted version of the original image is shown in Figure 6.8 (b) and the 
decryption of the original image following changes to the first, second and third 
seeds are shown in (c), (d) and (e), respectively. Similarly, performing decryption 
following minor changes to the first, second and third encryption equations are 
shown in (f), (g) and (h) respectively. With respect to (f), (g) and (h), it is clear 
that in all cases the secret keys used in the DMEX approach exhibit high 
sensitivity. Also from the results in Figure 6.7, it can also be said that the MEX 
approach has the same specifications of high key sensitivity.  
6.2. Summary 
In this chapter, the ZZ, EX, MZZ, MEX and DMEX approaches have been 
tested when applied to image encryption using a number of test image examples. 
Assessments have been made of the robustness of the approaches using a range of 
statistical tests. For the proposed ZZ and EX approaches, only the histogram test 
was used to evaluate the approaches. The histogram results showed non-uniform 
distributions and the high vulnerability of the methods to statistical attacks. As 
this made ZZ and EX unsuitable for practical image encryption, no further tests 
were carried out for these methods in this chapter. In the histogram analysis of the 
MZZ approach, results showed an almost uniform distribution, indicating low 
vulnerability to statistical attacks. Although this approach MZZ for encrypting 
images produced high entropy, it resulted in low entropy for zero images. Hence, 
it can be said that, the entropy effect of this approach was appropriate for some 
images, whereas, it was not for others. Therefore, this approach is unsuitable for 
practical image encryption. 
It was found that MEX and DMEX exhibited encryption security performance 
similar to that found in the literature for other modern algorithms. The histogram 
results showed an almost uniform distribution, indicating low vulnerability to 
statistical attacks. In addition, for these methods, the entropy results indicated a 
uniform distribution of energy between pixels, as would be expected of high-
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performance encryption algorithms. MEX and DMEX also exhibited low 
correlation between adjacent pixels of the encrypted image, indicating strong 
resistance to statistical attacks. The proposed approaches were also demonstrated 
to be highly sensitive to minor changes to the secret key values. Overall, MEX 
and DMEX have been demonstrated to be viable alternative methods for 
generating keys known only to the encryption user.  
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Chapter 7. Conclusions 
Humans exchange a large volume of digital data through public channels on a 
daily basis. The majority of this data is confidential and private; however, the 
transmission of this data through the public channels can make it fall into wrong 
hands. To prevent this from happening, many security-related tools and 
techniques have been developed which ensure data security. A few of these 
techniques use a specific key, which is only known by the sender and the intended 
receiver. This protects the data file from any intruder attack.  
The Kerckhoffs's principle that states that the “cryptosystem must always be 
secure even though all information regarding the system (except the key) is public 
knowledge” [5], a principle that has been applied in this study. This principle is 
not followed when the security keys have been generated and distributed by a 3rd 
party, usually a commercial organization, military or governmental institute. This 
is because there is no guarantee that the security key is not retained by any 
member working for the 3rd party, or communicated to another ‘authority’. 
Maximum security is usually retained if the end-users have complete control over 
the key generation and usage. 
In this study a new technique is developed that permits the automatic 
generation of security keys using a process, which can be controlled by the 
cryptography users themselves. Eureqa is an evolutionary computing tool that has 
been previously used for generating keys using a unique mathematical equation, 
which a purposely-generates a random number sequence. This technique of 
generating the security keys was a continuation of the research work that was first 
conducted by Blackledge et al and Dlamini. 
The technique that was used by Blackledge et al. for generating the keys based 
on a mathematical equation took more than 23 hours for completion. Dlamini 
carried out the encryption of the keys with the help of a risk-based multi-factor 
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authentication system that monitored the user behavior and protected the access to 
the cloud-based services. Dlamini used the Eureqa technique for generating the 
key encryption function. However, their technique required exhausting time for 
calculations that were conducted on a standards desktop system.  
Longer processing time is undesirable in practical scenarios. For the success of 
real-time streaming applications, the keys need to be generated and applied within 
an acceptable time frame. Furthermore, these keys need to be reliable and 
extremely secure. Security of the keys must be further tested using different 
statistical techniques. This has been the primary objective of this study. 
Chapter 1 introduced the topic of key encryption and described the 
Eureqa tool. It also included the research motivation, along with the aims and 
objectives of this study. This chapter presented the contributions made in this 
thesis and outlined the manner in which this thesis was organized.  
Chapter 2 presented the background and history of cryptography and 
described the literature review. The concept of confidentiality was also described 
and the uses of information encryption and hiding process highlighted. The 
applications of cryptography in the symmetric and asymmetric systems were 
mentioned and the concept of randomness related to cryptography was described. 
Some of the studies that were published in the literature were also 
reviewed and they were categorized into 4 sections, i.e., 3rd party encryption, 
which uses PRNGs for developing encryption algorithms, chaotic encryption, and 
evolutionary computing. Many consumers tend to generate keys using a 3rd party 
encryption service. Several online key generators generate keys using random 
numbers and physical phenomena like www.random.org. Atmospheric data is 
used as chaotic encryption for generating high entropy. Though the randomness of 
the generated numbers cannot be proved, a majority of the statistical tests indicate 
that these are one of the best available random number sources. 
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The values generated are further used for training the evolutionary 
computing model so that it generates a few pseudo-random numbers more 
efficiently than a conventional PRNGs such as the linear congruential generators. 
Furthermore, this model can be used for seeding conventional PRNGs.  
Eureqa, which is an evolutionary computing software suite, generates a 
pseudo random number and can be successfully used in several cryptographic 
applications. However, the time required for obtaining the encryption is not suited 
for conducting local encoding or even some real-time stream ciphers. In this 
thesis, an effective and faster computing technique has been used, which 
generates keys that are more suited for the various real-time applications. An 
effective solution was presented which can generate automated keys with the help 
of the Eureqa software, but within a very short period of time. 
Chapter 3 describes the architectural design and methodology of the new 
encryption system that was proposed in Chapter 2. Different strategies were 
described in this chapter such as (i) ZigZag (ZZ) strategy; wherein 3 main 
generators were provided with a common seed that helped in the generation of 3 
different mathematical equations; (ii) EXtended (EX) strategy; wherein a single 
mathematical equation was used for generating 100 random numbers; (iii) 
Modified ZigZag (MZZ) strategy where 3 different secret keys could be generated 
using 3 differing key generators. This created 3 different mathematical equations 
for improving the security since this technique performed the Exclusively-ORed 
operations 3 times; (iv) Modified EXtended (MEX) strategy which used a single 
mathematical equation for generating security keys and one arbitrary sequence of 
random numbers, which was equal to the size of the plaintext (i.e., image or  text).  
Thereafter, a Dual Modified EXtended (DMEX) strategy was used for 
acquiring 3 mathematical equations. These equations could be used for producing 
an arbitrary length of random number sequences for generating the keys that 
enabled the encryption and decryption of plaintext (i.e., image or text) using 
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ORed operations thrice. The different descriptive methods were sequentially 
tested. In this study, a ZZ technique was developed and evaluated (i.e., 
performance evaluation) using statistical tests as described in Chapter 4. This 
chapter presents a novel approach, which could be easily executed, required a 
short calculation time and displayed higher security.  
Chapter 4 presents the results of the evaluation that was carried out for 
the performance of data generated using the Eureqa tool. The Eureqa tool used 
required 2 different random number sources (i.e., a Linear Congruential Generator 
(LCG) along with the atmospheric noise obtained from www.random.org.), for 
generating a long sequence of numbers. Also, the values that were generated by 
the Eureqa key generator using various statistical tests had to be tested for 
ensuring that the acquired sequences were uniform and independent. 
A Chi-squared statistical test was carried out for determining the 
randomness of the number sequences using a single and double-precision 
technique. Results indicated that the uniformity was higher when double-precision 
was applied, irrespective of the initial source. The uniformity was low when a 
single-precision was applied. All the obtained sequences showed higher 
independence. Furthermore, the distribution quality of a random sequence was 
assessed using the NIST statistical test suite (NIST SP800-22). The NIST 
statistical software is regarded as a de facto standard test for determining the 
RNGs for the various cryptographic applications. The results showed that all the 
random number sequences, generated by the Eureqa tool, passed the NIST test for 
randomness. This indicated that all number sequences displayed a random 
characteristic. 
Two different computer architectures were used in this chapter, i.e., 32 bit 
and 64 bits, for determining the impact of using different devices for carrying out 
the encryption / decryption process. The results indicated that the use of different 
devices for encryption and decryption did not permit the retrieval of the primary 
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message. It was concluded that one needed to use the same word length for the 
devices while carrying out an encryption or decryption process. 
Chapter 5 describes the various practical applications of all the proposed 
encryption techniques like the ZZ, EX, MZZ, MEX and DMEX. These techniques 
were evaluated to determine if all the users could control the generation of 
encryption keys with regard to their effectiveness and application for text 
encryption. In order to determine how the candidate approaches perform when a 
potential eavesdropper attempts to attack the system, statistical tests were 
conducted, namely, key sensitivity, entropy and key space analysis. The 
performance of these techniques based on their execution time and throughput 
was also evaluated. Results highlighted a clear defect in the ZZ, EX and MZZ 
approaches, which despite high entropy values indicated that these techniques 
were not suitable for practical applications. On the other hand, the results showed 
that the MEX and DMEX techniques displayed a similar quality and security 
performance to popular algorithms published in the literature. In particular, the 
MEX and DMEX techniques showed higher entropy values, which indicated that 
these techniques could endure entropy-based attacks, and their key space was 
large enough to tolerate brute-force attacks. It was seen that these techniques were 
sensitive to small changes affecting the secret key values and resilient to the anti-
differential attacks. The MEX technique showed a higher throughput, whereas the 
DMEX technique displayed a relatively lower throughput. Since the DMEX 
showed higher security and throughput, it was seen to be the most effective 
method that allowed a secure transmission of confidential and private information. 
Finally, in Chapter 6, tests were made on the above-mentioned ZZ, EX, 
MZZ, MEX and DMEX processes after applying the image encryption feature on 
different test images. The robustness of these techniques was determined using a 
variety of statistical tests. Only a histogram test was used for evaluating the 
proposed ZZ and EX. Results for this test showed that these methods displayed a 
non-uniform distribution and higher susceptibility to the statistical attacks. Thus, 
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it was concluded that the ZZ and EX methods were not suitable for carrying out 
practical image encryption, and hence, these methods were not subjected to any 
other statistical analysis. The histogram analysis of the MZZ technique showed 
that this method displayed an almost uniform distribution, which highlighted its 
lower susceptibility to statistical attacks. Though this approach showed a high 
entropy; it also introduced a lower entropy in the zero image. Despite the fact that 
the entropy values were better than the ZZ and EX techniques, these values were 
still seen to be unsatisfactory. This made the MZZ technique not suitable for the 
practical image encryption process. 
The MEX and the DMEX techniques were also analyzed using many 
statistical tests. Both these techniques showed a satisfactory encryption security 
performance, which was on par with other modern algorithms mentioned in the 
literature. Histogram results indicated an almost uniform distribution that showed 
a lower vulnerability to statistical attacks. Additionally, the entropy results for 
these methods showed a uniform distribution of the energy between the pixels, 
which was similar to the published high-performance encryption algorithms. The 
MEX and DMEX techniques exhibited a lower correlation between the adjacent 
pixels of an encrypted image. Higher resistance to these approaches indicated a 
higher sensitivity to minor changes occurring in the secret key values. Thus, it 
was concluded that the MEX and DMEX techniques were viable alternative 
techniques that could be used for generating the keys that were also known by the 
encryption users.  
7.1. Summary 
After analyzing the statistical results of the MEX and DMEX technique, it was 
concluded that these techniques were dependable alternative approaches, which 
could be used for generating keys that were only known to the user after an 
encryption process. The MEX and DMEX approaches generated keys in a shorter 
time compared to existing and well-known algorithms. Despite the reduction in 
the calculation time, these techniques did not compromise on security levels. 
Chapter 7  Conclusions 
 
  104 
 
The DMEX approach displayed a higher confidentiality (i.e., security) level for 
both the text and image inputs; however, it required a higher time for encrypting 
and decoding the text files, where the text was divided into a set of blocks. The 
use of 3 exclusive ORed operations (or more complicated process) further 
increased the power of the algorithm. However, this algorithm needed more time 
for use on text files, which decreased the throughput. 
On the other hand, the MEX approach offered a higher throughput, since it 
required a shorter encryption and decryption time. This technique encrypted and 
decrypted the plaintexts bit-by-bit using a stream cipher. 
 
7.2. Recommendations for future work 
 
Based on the results derived in this thesis, some areas could be identified 
which require further research. The effect of the seed changes at the various 
encryption levels needs to be investigated further. During the encryption of the 
images, an image of a specific size must be used. However, in future, one must 
test the performance of the algorithm using different sizes of the same images. 
Also, the algorithm must be developed and tested for coloured image.  
One drawback of encryption methods that require both sender and receiver to 
share the same key, is the additional requirement to ensure the security of that 
key. The approaches developed in this thesis also have this drawback. The three-
pass approach was described in Blackledge et al. [30] (and was discussed in 
section 2.3.2) and is able to overcome the requirement to share keys. A useful 
enhancement to the approaches implemented in this thesis would be to implement 
Eureqa on both the sender’s and receiver’s systems and develop an additional 
software layer so that the three three-pass protocol can be realised. This would 
enhance the security of the system while still permitting users to retain control of 
the key generation process.  
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The implementation of the encryption approaches described in this thesis 
require that a random number source is available. Certain use cases may not have 
access to such a source, for example, if the system needs to operate over a private 
network. In such cases, an alternative method of generating random numbers is 
needed. Possible approaches that could be considered include an internal 
algorithm for pseudo-random number generation, an internal file of previously-
generated random numbers that is itself accessed in a random fashion to allow it 
to be used over many cycles, or an extrapolated set of values sampled from a 
previously-generated Eureqa model of a random number sequence. For all these 
proposed approaches, verification of a similar nature to that carried out in this 
thesis would be needed to ensure that the data generated are suitable for 
encryption purposes.  
The throughput of the DMEX approach needs to be significantly 
improved. The text file must be divided into different groups of blocks having a 
size of 255 × 255. This increases the encryption and decryption time. 
Furthermore, the performance of these algorithms needs to be tested against audio 
files for example and their effect and encryption strength determined.  
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